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         considered guilty of suicide but had he been unlearned and believed
         that he would be sinning by drinking the milk, he would not be con-
         sidered a suicide and the son would be allowed to drink the milk.]
         It is further written there, “I searched high and low throughout ‘the
         Sea of the Talmud’ and didn’t find a single Tanna, Amora or halachic
         authority who introduces such a hugely novel ruling [that the son is
         allowed to drink]. On the contrary, they uttered the decree, ‘Do we
         tell a person to sin so that his colleague will benefit?! (Shabbos 4a)....’”
         The final conclusion is that under no circumstances can the son be
         permitted to drink the milk.

            We can learn from these comments that in our case, since the
         young woman has an obligation to complete her pregnancy and give
         birth to the child, we may not violate the sin of killing fetuses in order
         to save her from suicide.

            We find a similar question in Teshuvos Melemed Leho’il (1, 61), con-
         cerning a young man whose father instructed him to participate in a
         writing class in a trade school on the holy day of Shabbos. The son
         refused. His mother told him that if didn’t obey his father’s instruc-
         tions, resulting in discord in the house, she would put an end to her
         life. The son asked whether he had to listen to his father on account
         of his mother’s piku’ach nefesh.

            The answer is that this is not a situation of piku’ach nefesh in which
         Shabbos is desecrated since the mother is deliberately choosing to
         commit suicide in order to get her son to violate his faith. Were we
         to concede to such demands, all seducers would threaten to throw
         themselves into the ocean if others did not consent to their seduc-
         tion. See Teshuvos Yehudah Ya’aleh (Even Ha’ezer 140) who writes
         that a woman who has done chalitzah may not be allowed to marry a
         kohen even if there are grounds for concern that the couple may apos-
         tatize [which is more serious than losing their lives] if not permitted
         to marry. All the more so is it forbidden to allow Shabbos desecration
         out of concern for suicide. In our case too then, this is not considered
         piku’ach nefesh that allows the violation of Torah prohibitions.

            However, the actual argument employed by the Etz Chaim and
         Melemed Leho’il requires explanation. It is evident from Rashi in

356  1  Medical-Halachic Responsa of Rav Zilberstein
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