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186    Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf

              enterprises and the Catholic Church in Manama were burnt or severely
              damaged. British and European residents were evacuated from the market
              area, while petrol stations were targeted and menacing crowds marched in
              front of the British political residency and of Belgrave’soffice shouting
              anti-British slogans. 94
                By the end of 1956 mob violence and sectarian resurgence had become
              enmeshed with the potent nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric of
              al-Ha’yah. In this respect, the organisation was fairly effective as a broad-
              based movement of urban political protest. Yet the front of popular mobi-
              lisation was clearly divided and violence had become an essential tool for
              political protest. These divisions limited the effectiveness of al-Ha’yah as a
              modern political organisation and contributed to seal its fate in November
              1956.


                     The limits of national space
              In the tense climate which characterised British imperial politics in the
              Arab Middle East during the Suez crisis, the riots of 1956 precipitated
              British military intervention in Bahrain and the disbanding of al-Ha’yah,
              only a few months after the organisation had received official recognition
              from the government. Members and followers of al-Ha’yah still attribute
              the collapse of national ‘resistance’ to the evils of military intervention as
              British troops entered Manama in November 1956. British intervention
              gave further credit to a long-standing tradition in Manama’s political
              culture, that of blaming ‘foreigners’ for the evils which befell the town.
              It is true that in the following decades British support allowed the govern-
              ment to create a ‘national security’ sphere which posed severe constraints
                                                          95
              on the activities of clubs and political associations.  Yet the nationalist
              and anti-imperialist lore which surrounds the turbulent popular politics of
              1954–6 has tended to underplay the shortcomings of Arabism and Pan-
              Arabism as ideologies of popular mobilisation able to appeal to the cos-
              mopolitan and communitarian tradition of Manama.
                The archetypal nationalist logic of the ideologues of al-Ha’yah, partic-
              ularly that of al-Bakir, shows the limits posed by Arabism in transforming
              Manama into a cohesive national space. While claiming to champion the
              interests of Bahraini nationals (al-wataniyyun), the political community
              94
                Political Resident Bahrain to Foreign Office, 4 March 1956, FO 371/120544 PRO; al
                Bakir, Min al-Bahrayn, pp. 105, 116; Belgrave Diaries, 2 March and 1–3 November 1956,
                AWDU; Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain, p. 104.
              95
                al-Bakir, Min al-Bahrayn, pp. 112, 189–90 and 125–50; Khuri, Tribe and State in
                Bahrain, p. 104; Interview with Murad Jasim, Manama, 18 April 2004; Rumaihi,
                Bahrain, pp. 220–29.
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