Page 193 - Begrave Thesis_Neat

It could be argued that the deliberations between the Resident and the

Eastern Department at the FO, headed by Riches, in addition to Burrows’ work

between the Ruler and the HEC to reach a level of understanding between the two

sides, had saved Bahrain from an almost-inevitable disaster. Riches thought that

Burrows had acted sensibly during the crisis a matter on which he commended him.

Based on a written discussion between the two, Riches conceded that Britain must

not take any action against the HEC basing his decision on three arguments. The

first affirmed that there was no concrete evidence to believe that the HEC staged the

recent disturbance. The second was that individuals cannot be arrested based on

their ideas. The third underlined that direct British intervention would commit

Britain and would be seen as depriving the Ruler of his own authority. 541

Al-Bakir claimed in his memoir that the stoning of Lloyd’s car convoy was a

turning point in Britain’s policy towards the HEC, as Britain then conspired to

‘execute its plans to eliminate the Committee’. 542 The British Cabinet’s attitude

towards developments in Bahrain were never shared at the time with the HEC nor

were they made public. The attitude of the Residency seemed, on the contrary,

genuinely sincere in its attempt to end local hostilities, urging both sides to reach a

level of understanding. Therefore Al-Bakir’s comment on British policy after the

Lloyd incident was incorrect as it failed to reflect the reality on the ground and the

status quo.

Eden was to face a disgruntled House of Commons on 7 March with events in

Jordan and Bahrain dominating the debate. Eden, with the short time he had,

541 TNA, FO 371/120544, D.M.H. Riches on Bahrain, 5 March 1956.
542 Al-Bakir, From Bahrain to Exile, 106.

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