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minutes also revealed that there was a strong belief publically that the arrest of the

Movement’s leading figures was imminent. 550

Burrows thought that ‘any disturbance of basically local origin is apt to have

overtones of Egyptian propaganda and, therefore anti-Iraq feeling, added to it’.

Burrows believed that Egyptian radio played a critical role locally compared with

Iraq’s radio station. To the Resident the Egyptians were ‘in a different class to that

of Iraq and Egypt has so far shown itself the most ready provider of experts and

technicians’. Burrows recommended to the FO the establishment of cultural

missions between Iraq and Arab Gulf States, to strengthen Iraqi influence and

diminish that of Egypt. 551

In a note from the British Prime Minister to his Minister of Defence on 10

March, Eden declared that ‘We have just got to get it into these people’s heads that

the situation in the Persian Gulf may become highly dangerous at any moment’.

Eden further warned that oil supplies must not be compromised and military

support was vital for its protection. He insisted that ‘Both the political and military

difficulties have got to be overcome’. 552

In March the situation in the Middle East looked gloomy for Britain,

Conservative politician William Clark summarised in his memoir the state of affairs

as he saw them:

General Glubb, commander of the British-trained Arab Legion in
Jordan, was sacked by King Hussein, which was a shocking blow to
our prestige throughout the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact was

550 TNA, FO 1016/465, Residency Minutes, 9 March 1956.
551 TNA, FO 1016/465, Burrows to FO, 10 March 1956.
552 TNA, PREM 11/1471, M.42/56, Prime Minister’s Personal Minute, 10 March 1956.

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