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The NUC submitted an official written demand on 14 July to the Sheikh for

elected seats on the Administration Council and for Belgrave’s removal.

Surprisingly the demands were not attached to any threats of strikes as had been

feared. One possible explanation as to why the NUC did not threaten a strike was

that Bahraini villagers were awaiting their date harvest (according to the Agency)

and a strike would curtail sales of the crop. 731 Based on the Eastern Department’s

suggestion on 13 July the Ruler invited the NUC on 22 July to his palace to discuss

their latest set of demands. 732

As the new meeting between the Ruler and the NUC was about to begin the

Americans considered formally withdrawing their offer to assist in the construction

of the Aswan High Dam. The US National Security Council’s memorandum of

Discussion offered an insight into American views of the project. George M

Humphrey, the Secretary of the Treasury, wished that Egypt would agree to the

Soviet offer to build the dam. Dulles believed that in the short-term an Egyptian

agreement with the Soviets to have the latter finance the dam might reflect

negatively on the US but in the long term it would be seen positively. Dulles noted

that the loan for the dam would be a heavy burden on Egypt’s economy and that the

Egyptians would then blame their creditor for their suffering. 733 In July the British

Embassy sent a memorandum to the US Department of State in which it stated its

concern that a deal between Nasser and Moscow on the finance of the Aswan High

Dam was imminent. It was concerned that Nasser’s entanglement with the Soviets

731 TNA, FO 371/120547, Gault to FO, 15 July 1956.
732 TNA, FO 371/120547, Gault to FO, 23 July 1956.
733 FRUS, vol. XV, ‘Arab-Israeli Dispute January 1-July 26, 1956’. Doc. 412: S. Everett Gleason’s
Memorandum of Discussion at the 289 Meeting of the National Security Council, 28 June 1956.
th

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