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for the Middle East affairs, the two believed that a showdown with the NUC would

be a foolish thing, as the Party would enjoy massive support on the issue of

Belgrave’s dismissal. 725

Gault thought that both sides of the affair were to be blamed: the NUC was

stubborn in its demands on the Administration Council and so was the Ruler on the

issue of Belgrave’s leaving. With the success the Residency and Political Agency

seemed to have accomplished over the process of easing Belgrave out, it now

seemed to be suffering a setback.

The Ruler had informed the Editor-in-Chief of the suspended Al-Watan,

newspaper that, until things have settled down in Bahrain, ‘he could not let him

[Belgrave] go’. Gault added: ‘now that Belgrave’s personal position has become

involved, he will stiffen the Ruler’s resistance to what we may say’. 726 To the Agent

the matter had reached a point that ‘far from Belgrave’s going being a blow to

British influence in this area, his remaining becomes a far greater liability to us’. 727

On 11 July a British Cabinet meeting discussed the status of Belgrave and

developments in Bahrain. The Foreign Secretary said that although steps were

being made to appoint a new British official to take on Belgrave’s duties, the Adviser

seemed to be having second thoughts about his retirement. Lloyd feared that a

decision to retain Belgrave would push the NUC to call for a national strike. He thus

725 TNA, FO 371/120547, D.H.M. Riches’ Confidential on Bahrain, 10 July 1956.
726 TNA, FO 371/120547, Despatch 614, Gault to FO, 10 July 1956.
727 TNA, FO 371/120547, Gault to FO, 11 July 1956.

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