Page 101 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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his gardons near Pno. Ho suggested that as soon as lie reported about the
actual move of troops lo Fao, (he British Ambassador should ho directed to
enquiro what the object of the movement was, and that ho should inform the
Porte that wo would not permit an attack to ho made on ICoweit, and that then
the several questions about the Sheikh of Koweit could ho discussed and settled
diplomatically betweon the two Governments, namely, (1) the status of iho
Sheikh ; (i) his right to the estates near Eao.
87. In his letter No. 5S, dated 7th May 1S99, Colonel Moado reported that
the Vali of Basrah (liamdi Pasha) was
No. 112 of Secrot E., Juno 1890, No.. 0-4-119.
likely to encourage Sheikh Pasim of
Katar, Yusuf-bin-Tbrahim of Bora and tho Chief of Shamroar to take some
action against tho Sheikh of Koweit, that Mubarak’s nophews had gone from
Zobcir to Basrah probably to push their claims to the estates in Fao before tho
Courts, reckoning on the sympaties of the Vali. As regards Mubarak's status,
Colonel Alcadc thought that his acceptance of tiio title of Kai-Makam from the
Turks could not affect his position as an independent Chief. Such a title had
been hold by his predecessors without their independence being affected. Colo­
nel Meade added:—
" It would certainly have been more satisfactory if we could have come to an arrangement
about Koweit in lb'J7, before the Sheikh w.is offered Turkish recognition, but I am of
opinioD that neither he nor his predecessors have considered that any recognition or title bes­
towed by the Suit an affects their independent position at Koweit itself, and that the title
of Kaim-M akam, when accepted, has been chiefly regarded as referring lo thtir estates in Turkey,
the possession of which is undobiedly a source of weakness lo them, as they are liable lo be
constantly harassed in regard to those propc'lies by Turkish officials. They consider, probably,
that the title of Kaim Mnknm gives them an official position in return, and enables them to
meet official attacks. Sheikh Mubarak was well aware that whatever recognition he might
have received from tho Sultan, would bo of little avail if it suited the Turks to support his
nephews against him, and he himself welcomed the opportunity of obtaining our support.
There is no doubt, too, that, whatever may have boon done to rc-assurc the Sheikh by offering
him recognition and a title, the Turks have, for some time, been waiting for n favourable
opportunity to interfere actively in Koweit affairs, with the object of completely absorbing it
in the Turkish Empire. 'Ibis will be the ulterior object of their interference whatever side
they take."
88. The Political Resident further proposed that, as the Turkish Govern­
ment was likely to oppose the establishment of our influence, at least one gun
boat should be kept at Koweit, pending settlement of the Sheikh’s status. 11c
also suggested that a secret news agent should bo appointed at Koweit.
89. The Government of India approved of the last two proposals and tho
Military Department was directed to arrange to keep the Lapwing in tho
Shat-cl-Arab or at Busbire for tho time.
90. It was also decided that if Colonel Meade could get a reliable man
to act as secret news-agent for Rs. 50 a month, he should be allowed to do so
temporarily and experimentally.
91. Sheikh Mubarak seemed anxious at the timo to precipitate matters
against tho Porte, probably dependent, upon the support of the British. About
May 1899 he established a Customs Department at Koweit and imposed an
import duty of 5 per cent, ad valorem on all goods arriving at tho port, in­
cluding goods from lias rah and other Turkish ports, which had been previously
exempted from duty on presentation of a certificate from tho Turkish Custom
Houses. Colonel Meade in reporting this fact (letter No. 62, dated llth May
1899) expressed fears that the Sheikh’s
No. 114 of Secret E.. June 1899, Nr*. 9-4-119.
action might precipitate some move against
him on the part of the Turks. It was. however, believed that the Porte would
first incite the chiefs of Shammarand Katar and other Arab Chiefs to make
raids against Koweit and then herself interfere as peace-maker to the detriment
of Koweit.
92. In submitting Colonel Meado’s lottors Nos. 51, 58 and G3 referred to
above, the Government of India observed
No- 11C of Secret E„ Juno lb9l, No* 91-119.
(Dospatch No. 101, dated 1st Juno
1899)—