Page 100 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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No. Cto. Commanding on the defensibleness, by naval force alone, of Koiceil Tho
naval Commandcr-in-Chinf's opinion was that with sufficient warning to collect
ships the navy alone could undertake the dcfcnco of Koweit.
7S. On tho lGtli February the Secretary of State telegraphed again:_
No. 636 " Lord Salisbury desires to l.avo earliest possible notice, if preparatory measures aro found
to be necessary for dofenco of Koweit against Turkish attack in order to givo serious warn­
ing to Turkey before forcihlo measures aro used on the spot, to prevent such an attack. Please
arraDge accordingly to obtaiu and send information in regard to this matter/'
79. The Naval Commandcr-in-Chicf, who was consulted, telegraphed on
1st March :— 0
No. C70.
“ No preparatory measures by the navy are necessary. I only rcqniro sufTicisut warning
(0 concentrate a few ships of war at Koweit. It would simplify matters if I could be authorized
to forcibly prevont the Turkish transports leaving the Shat-cl-Arab.w
80. This telegram was repeated to the Secretary of State. Ilis Excellency
the Viceroy, added :—
No. cco. " 1 n the event of concent ration of ships being thought necessary, I shall telegraph immediate
information to Your Lordship, and I think the Admiral should be authorized to stop trans­
ports provided he is satisfied regarding their destination ”,
81. The Secretary of State wired back on 7th March :—
No. C72. “ Lord Salisbury doubts expediency of authorizing stoppago of transports until occasion
arises, and in any case considers such instructions should issue from Admiralty if issued at

82. His Excellency the Viceroy then wired (telegram dated 8th March
1899):—
No. G7S.
“ I had not proposed that Admiral should bo instructed otherwise than by Admiralty. If
authority is not to be asked or given until occasion arises, is thr-re no danger of transports
reaching destination, while we are telegraphing? Will Lord Salisbury therefore consider
advisability of such instructions as may be desired by him ?”
83. The Secretary of State telegraphed on 14th March :—
No. G61. “Your telegram of 8th March. Koweit. Lord Salisbury onquired what grounds exist for
immediate instructions to Admiralty as proposed, 6ince no attack is imminent. Procedure
now authorised is that, when hostile action by Turks appears to be contemplated, serious warn­
ing will bo addressed to Porlo before protective measures aro taken. Proposed instructions to
Admiralty would reserve this procedure and involve risk of publicity also/'
84. His Excellency then replied on lGtli March:—
No. C82. “The grounds for instructions to Admiralty as proposed by mo were that information
reached us in February that Turkish troops had gradually boon concentrated at Basrah, and
were believed by Resident to be meditating early attack upon Koweit. To avert this or any
similar danger in future, I suggested that general instructions should bo issued from Admiralty
to stop Turkish transports from starting at any time for Koweit. If no such instructions are
issued in advance, the Turks may have landed there before we hear of it in India. In any
case, unless British gun-boat happens to be in the port at the moment, wo shall probably be
too late to stop them. British Vice-Consul at Basrah has been instructed by us to telegraph
immediately any probable movemont of Turkish troops.”

X.—(1) Question of status of the Sheikh of Koweit- (2) Turkish
activity in the neighbourhood and measures adopted for the
prevention of an attack on Koweit. (3) Imposition of customs
duty by the Sheikh—March—June 1899-
85. In liis telegram, dated 23rd March 1S99, Colonel Meade reported that
it was not likely that Turkey would
Secret E., June 1899, Noa. 91119.
attempt anything against Koweit, as tho
hot weather was beginning. But on 17th April lie telegraphed that Hamid
Pasha, who had been Vali of Basrah two years previously and had supported
the cause of Mubarak’s nephews, had been ro-appoiuted to that place and that
it was rumoured that he was going to send a battalion, to Eao shortly.
80. In his letter No. 51, dated 30th April 1899, the Political Besident
reported that the Turks had apparently
No. 110 of Secret E., Juoc 1899, Nos. 94—119.
some knowledge of tho British negotia­
tions at Koweit and that this accounted for the proposed movement of troops
to Eao, that though no attack on Koweit could bo expected, beforo tbe autumn,
it was unlikely that tho Sheikh would be allowed to got bis date harvest from