Page 162 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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No. 849. (7) Tolcgram, dated tho 26tb Mnj 1901. .
From—Ilia Majesty’s Secretary 0f Stato for India,
To—Ilia Excellency tho Viceroy.
Ploasc refer to your telegram dated tho 20th May 1001, regarding Nejd affairs Re-
presentations were made by Sir N. O’Conor to tho Porte on your telegram of tho 29th April
and were renewed on hearing from the Vice-Consul at Jedah that troops were bein~ assem­
bled at Medina in order to assist the Amir of Nejd. He says that these representations may
perhaps make the Sultan reluctant, but that they will hardly turn him from tho courso which
he can fairly urge is calculated to provent internal troubles and disturbances of the stains quo.
He odds that he docs not sea on what grounds he can press the Turks to desist from helping
the Amir, who is tho party attacked without appearing as a distinct partisan of Bin Saud.
He also adverts to question of general policy, and points out that ou these grounds there are
objections against preventing the Turks from assisting tho Amir against Bin Saud whose
apparent object is to re-establish the Wahabi dynasty throughout Certral Arabia, result of
which might in the near futuro be fraught with serious consequences and might imperil our
authority at Koweit where in the existing condition of affairs our influence is yearly growing
stronger. Sir N. O’Conor's idea is that we should confine ourselves for the present to main^
taining intact territory of Koweit and awaiting developments, but that if the Turks persist,
as he anticipates, in assisting the Amir, it might bo expedient to reconsider the question of
appointing a Resident at Koweit. Please let me have your views on the above questions. In
view of our declared policy of prohibiting the traffic in arms, how would you propose to keep
from interfering with the importation of arms for Bin Saud?

No. 850. (8) Telegram, No. 174S-E A , dated the 29th May 1901.
From—His Excellency the Viceroy,
To—His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India.
Please see your telegram of the 25tli May 1904*. Our position in regard to the affairs
of Nejd is explained in our Secret Despatch No. 69, 24th March 1904. Representations might
be made by Sir N. O'Conor to the effect that so long as the Turks refrained from interference
in Nejd affairs, wo also abstained from intervention ; that we have no desiro to assist Bin Saud
directly or indirectly ; but than our interests in Eastern Arabia are such that wo cannot view
with indifference intervention on behalf of ono of the parties contending for supremacy in
Nejd which must affect the tribes with which wo have relations; that the relative rights of
the two contending parties being so equal that the better courso would be to leave both sides
alone both in the interests of peace and with a view to the avoidance of internal troubles. It
might further be pointed out that the Turks were unable in 1902 to prevent filibustering
expedition against Koweit starting from Turkish territory, and that the present support of
Bin Rashid may strengthen him beyond Turkish powers of control, and produce situation
which, having regard to our relations with Mubarak, we could not view with indifference. As
to Sir O’Conor’s view of the general political aspect of the situation our opinion is as follows : the
growth of our influence with Sheikh Mubarak has been concurrent wiih the success of his friend,
Bin Saud, and our prestige at Koweit must suffer materially if, through our active interven­
tion to prevent Mubarak assisting Bin Saud, and to prevent importation of arms, we permit
Turkish influence to determine supremacy of the Turkish, nominee against Bin Saud, which
on analogy of the case of Iiasa of lb7I would probably mean absortion of Nejd by the Turks.
The destruction of Mubarak’s influence aud a possible attack from a direction which has not
hitherto been contemplated on Koweit territory, the limits of which towards the interior are
not defined, would naturally result from Turkish supremacy in Nejd. We might thus be
forced again to assist Mubarak actively against the Turks. The. re-cstablishment of toe
Wahabi dynasty, which is now rather territorial Ilian fanatical, would, in our opinion, bo open
to less objection than this. We cannot agree therefore that our authority at Koweit woul
be imperilled by the success of Bin Saud, or that wo can preserve Koweit territory intact better
than by preventing Turkish intervention on behalf of Bin Rashid. With reference to my
telegram, dated the 2Ulh May 1904, we quite agree as to posting a Political Agent at °^v.el
end will immediately select one if you approve. We think it not improbable that sue ac io
might have a wholesome effect upon Turkish attitude of mind.
Up to the present no arrangements have been made with the Porte.for combined suppression
of traffic in the importation of arms which is briskly proceeding. It is not therefore a .
authorising Mubarak to import arms or even of relaxing existing measures for tho proven
of the traffic, but for merely allowing matters to remain Us they are. We can, it
protest, offer to do our best to prevent trade on the understanding that they will re r ,
interfering in Nejd affairs, and co-operate with us in the manner suggested in our P . ,
dated the 31st March 1908. An admission of our supremacy in Koweit that would
to us hereafter would result from such a protest.