Page 32 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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and informed Government by tolegrapli that bis visit bad boon “ satisfactorily
concluded, and our rotations aro now quite friendly.”

XXIII—Differences between the Sultan of Maskat and Amir of
Nejd. 1864-1865.
77. Colonel Polly visited Masknt on bis way to Bombay in April 1805. TTo
elicited by bis enquiries that tbc differences between the Masknt and Waliabi
States had a tow-fold aspect :—first, the rebellion of the heredtary Chief of
Rostack, who had thrown off his allegiance to Maskat, and declared foalty to
the Wahabi Amir; secondly, and principally a demand on the part of the
Wahabi Amir for an increased rate of annual tribute from the Sultan, com­
bined with a threat of invasion in case of non-compliance.
78. The Sultan of Maskat expressed his willingness to abide by any
arrangement which Colonel Pelly might suggest. There was reason to fear
that the quarrel had gone too far to render mediation of any elTcct, but it
was clearly the only remedy which could ho attempted. Colonel Pelly accord­
ingly wrote to the Chief of Itostack, inviting him to Maskat under a guarantee
of Bafe-conduct, with a view to an omicablo discussion of differences. He also
wrote to the Wahabi Amir, stating his readiness to afford good offices, and
enclosed a letter from the Sultan of Maskat, in which the latter declared himself
prepared to abide by whatever settlement the Resident might make.
79. The Chief of Rostock replied that the offer of mediation had come
too late, he being already irretrievably commited to the Wahabis. No reply
could be expeoied from the Wahabi Amir for some time, and it was altogether
questionable whether he would assent to any amicable arrangement “ When I
was at his capital” wrote Colonel Pelly “bespoke with contemptuous fierceness
of the Sultan of Maskat. declaring that he was a drowning man, and that he
the Amir would bring him to obedience by force.”
80. If good offices failed it appeared to Colonel Pelly that a practical ques­
tion would have to be met, viz., “supposing Maskat and the Wahabi Power to
go to war, what attitude would Government/wish to assume thereto?” To this he
answered that “in the abstract the true policy of Government in relation to all
disputes among tribes in theso regions appeared to bo to let those tribes tight
it out on shore, and for Government to limit itself to keeping the peace at
sea but there were certain circumstances in regard to Maskat which Colonel
Pelly thought it necessary to present for consideration :—
“Firstly, the second Article of the Maskat Treaty provides that, “tlie friend of that
Sirkar is the friend of this, and the friend of this Sirkar is to be the friend of that Sirkar, and
io the same way the enemy of this is to be the enemy of that.
11 Secondly, only three or four years ago Government imposed on itself the task of arbi­
trating the internal dissentions of the Maskat Stale, and by their arbitrament divided that
State into two separate Sultanates, thereby essentially weakening it, as well bv land as by sea.
“ Thirdly, the Maskat State lying wholly on the sea-board, seems to bo a description of
State which suits our policy.
“ Fourthly, Government have increasing telegraphic interests in Maskat territory; and
if the Maskat Sultanate fell that portion of these territories iu which those iuterests lie would
become subject to Persian interference.
“ If Government should wish to interfere they could do so, either by blockading the
Wahabi ports or by remonstrance, whether to the Ottoman Government or direct to the
Wahabi Amir.
“If Government should decide on remaining neutral, the question would arise as to
whether any objection should be offered to the Sultan of Maskat disturbing the peace of the
Persian Gulf by using whatever Naval means he may be able to collect for tho purpose o
blockading the Wahabi Ports ? This 16 a question which would effect my own. uty a®
Resident iu the Persian Gulf. But loth as I should bo to soe the peace of t he Gulf di6 ur
by a Naval armament of an exteiior Power, I cannot but admit that, under all the circum
t*nces of the case, the Sultan of Maskat would, in my opiuion, be justified, as a i *rl
State, in retaliating an invasion of his laud frontier, by a blockade of the enemy s c
line.'1