Page 34 - Gulf Precis (V)_Neat

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«There seoms much ground for believing that the great increase, which has token pi ace
during tbc last ten years, in the slave trade between East Africa and Arabia, is duo to --
a new
direction having been given to the naval enterprise of the tribes on the sea coast which were
formerly most imbued with Wahabi fanaticism and most active in piracy.
“ The visits of Mr. Palgravo and Colonel Pally to tho Wahabi capital bavc thrown
great light upon the resources of this power, and the information recorded by tlieso travellers
shows very clearly that the Wahabis have of late years been recovering from the effects
of the chastisement formerly inflicted on them, and that they aro likely to become exceedingly
troublesome to all in contact with them, who will not submit to their religious domination? *
“ A part from any internal impulse given by a revived spirit of religious fanaticism there
are several obvious causes of tho lato development of Wahabi aggressive power iu Arabia.
“Much is of course due to the natural effects of so many years of comparative rest in
repairing their exhausted resources; something also no doubt to the disappearance of the
generation which had experienced the power of the Egyptian Pasha, the late Imam of Maskat,
and of British Naval and Military expeditionary forces.
“ Mope however is probably owing to the sensible decay of vigour in the ruler of Maskat
and to the comparative rarity of any visit from our vessels of war to the old pirate coast of
the Persian Gulf.
“ But whatever tho cause, there can be no doubt of the evil effects of this revival of
Wahabi power, aod it is clear that these effects cannot be confined to tho Continent of Arabia.
We have had more than one warning symptom during the past year or two of a possible
revival of piracy on our own Indian Coasts. There is every year increased activity in the slave
trade carried on between East Afiioa and Arabia, chiefly by vessels belonging to the Wahabi
pirate ports, and the aggressions of the Wahabis by land on the territories of tho Imam of
Maskat, threaten seriously to injure a power which for several generations past has been the
only representative of civilization and order in Eastern Arabia.
“ I do not think that this is a state of things in which tho British Government in India
should be entirely passive. Our interest in the matter is not precisely the same as in 1821,
when the pirates from the Wahabi coast threatened serious injury to the general trade of
Bombay; but wo have Treaty ties with the Imam of Maskat, and there can bo no doubt that any
considerable increase of Wahabi influence would lead to, at least, an attempt to revive piracy,
and seriously impede the rapidly increasing commerce of the Persian Gulf. It might also at
any time interfere with our Telegraphic communication with Europe.
“ The important question remains what it behoves the British Government to do under
these circumstances ?
“ It seems quite dear that there is little chance of the Amir paying the slightest atten­
tion either to such friendly advice as Colonel Pelly gave him, or to the temperate remonstrances
of Colonel Disbrowe.
“ I would not for tho present advise any renewal of an attempt on tho part of oar
Political Agents to open a diplomatic correspondence with tho Amir of the Wahabis. He
is from his igoorance of our power not likely to pay the slightest attention to our wishes or
remonstrances, and for the present any attempt to open further communication with him is
only likely to embroil us further.
“ I would instruct Colonel Disbrowe to adopt a somewhat different tone to His Highness
the Imam of Maskat; to point out to His Highness clearly, but in temperate and friendly
language, that the aggressions of tbo Wahabis are not likely to be checked by tame acquies­
cence, or by a constantly increasing addition of the tribute His Highness pays to them, that
the Government of India will leam with regret, and surprise that its subjects have been
murdered and plundered in a large town under His Highness1 flag without any effectual at­
tempt on His Highness* part to punish his own rebellious subjects, or to expel hostile invaders.
,f I would point out to His Highness that the occasion is one which imperatively calls
upon him to imitate the example of his illustrious father, to set his finances in order, to
oonciliate and revive the spirit of his feudatory tribes, to reorganize his military and Mval
forces, and to repel by force, if negotiation fail, the insolent aggressions of his "V\ ahabi
neighbours.
“ I would not by any means lead him to lean on our aid in accomplishing these objects,
hut I would assure him of our intention scrupulously to fulfil our Treaty obligations, and of
our desire to give him every reasonable support, not only moral but material, in any well-direct­
ed efforts ho may make to re-establish his authority.
" There can be no doubt that His Highness* power, if properly exerted, ie ample to
effect all that is required. I would aid him with munitions, and, if absolutely
with assistance in money, and with the presence of 6uch ships of Her Majesty s naval or
in these Seas as the Commander-in-Cbief may think best calculated to bo of use in aiding in*
Imam to re-establish HU Highness’ authority in Sur or any other placo on the seaboard,
which hi* rebellioui subjects or the Wahabi enemy may havo dopiivcd him.

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