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man sees himself as tribal as well as Muslim. The problem would have been more
usefully understood if the relationship belween lslam and tribalism had been viewed
from the point of view of a٦ ordinary tribesman. Tribesmen never set themselves or
their tribal values against lslam, for they never see their ideological descent as
opposed to their religion. Te tribesmen are as much proud of their tribal descent as
of their lslamic identity. To conclude, I consider lslam as an integral part of the tribal
society, and both [slam and tribalism live in harmony. However, the most
important probiem in studying lslam, as summarized by Eickelman, is to ask how
lslam has been "elaborated, understood and subsequently reproduced in paritcular
place and at particular movements .٠. The main challenge for the study of lslam in
local contexts is to describe and analyze how the universalistic principles of lslam
have been realized in various social and historical contexts' (Eickelman 1983: 1- 16).

As we are dealing with the local level of practicing social control conrtol, dispute
and settlement and religious secular authority, one needs to state that a suggested
approach must aim at revealing the processes which lie behind those concepts. I am
inclined to say that I found the most suitable approach to be, in tihs case, the
action/dynamic one, particularly that of Ramyond Firth (1964) and Fredrik Barth
(1981) on the principles of social organization. In the processes of social conrtol and
dispute-settlement the rtibesmen in the lslamic tribal socieites are conrfonted with
siutaitons that require them to make choices and take decisions under different types
of consrtaint, some concerned with their enviromnent and others related to their owg
social system. A Hajari of the Emirates, similar to any tribesmainn the Islamie World,
must take a crucial decision about whether to accept a local mediaiton to setlte ihs
dispute with his wife or brothers over their shares in land, or to insist on tak‫ﺳ‬ng the
dispute to the qadi or the shaikh.

Dealing with the problem from a social dnyamic and aciton oriented approach will
permit us to hesitate before accepting peoples' statements at face value. hTe problem
entails differentiating between more than .one level of pracitce, or as Firht arg‫ﻫ‬es
"Familiariyt with difference between statement of ideal, norm and the acutaliyt of
social behaviour has helped to deepen anthropolog‫ﻫ‬cal understanding of how peopl'es
interesst dictate the form of theri representaitosn of socieyt' (1964 : 21). It would be
rfuitlses, then, if we talked about hte way people settle their disputes wgthout
revealing anything about the choices that lie beihnd their decisions: on whehter to
dispute or go for settlement. hTerefore, one's cenrtal concern wihle approaching the
procseses of social conrtol should be, as stated elsewhere by Barht "What are the
consrtainst and incentives that canalize choices?' (Barth 1981 : 35).

Finally, as long as relig‫ﻫ‬on is relevant to the social aciton of conrtol, it is important
to emphasise the sig‫ﻫﻫ‬ifcance of Weber's noiton on hte penertaiton of religious etihcs
into soical insitutitosn. Such relig‫ﻫ‬ous eethics create, as Weber arg‫ﻫ‬se, a thoereitcal
atitutde toward hte world based on relig‫ﻫ‬ous belief (Weber 1956 : 209). This leads us,
accordingly, to agree wiht Geeert's noiton of treating religion as a world vgew and a

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