Page 247 - Journal of Asian History_Neat
P. 247

('

                              M \niia vn.l.K: The Oltomnn I'runner ••/ nl-Hasti                101

               ,vod, the task was not dillicult. The   planned and oxocutnl an attack on Bahrein.
       As it pr«
     governors  of Bahrein showed themselves to be   The initiative was taken alone by the governor
     .miallv anxioua to |»rcM*rve  their autonomy in  general of Lal.isA, who presumably hoped to pre­
             of Ottoman pressure, untl used the prof-   sent Sultan Suleyman with a viclaire accomplic
     f.-r.-.l support of the Portuguese Hormuz fleet   and trusted that the new income in customs reve­
       -nil am! again to counter the several threatened   nue and pearls and the extension of direct imperial
               from Lahsa. This use of Portuguese   control at the expense of presumed Portuguese
     invasions
                         not to have identified the  plans would overcome the Sultan's displeasure
     military aid seems
     Bahrein government with that of the Portuguese   at the breach of discipline, the direct disobedience
     in the eyes of the Ottomans. In none of the several   of his own personal orders. .-Vs it happened, the
     lengthy reports and orders to and from LabsA and   first news the Imperial Council in Istanbul had
     Istanbul dealing with the projected and attempted   of the invasion was that the Lafysa garrison had   i
     Bahrein campaigns between 155S and 1591 is      been captured on Bahrein in an attempt to seize
     this fact, that Bahrein was an ally of the kuffar   the island. And further, that the main instrument
     enemy, noted as a reason for the invasion.      in their surrender was a detachment of kuffdr
       The first attempted and only realized invasion   ships from Hormuz, which the Portuguese had
     of Bahrein from Lahsa by the Ottomans was made   dispatched to the aid of the Iilrl governor.5’
     in the summer of 1559. It was led by Mustafa    The impression made in Istanbul could scarcely
     Pa§a, the governor general of LatisiL,5* and ended   have beeQ worse.10
     in the surrender of the Ottoman forces and an     Ail of the documents in the muhimnit series
     ignominious withdrawal to the mainland after the   pertaining to this invasion are concerned with the
     payment of ransom. This much is given in the    problem of extracting the garrison from Bahrein
     Portuguese sources and is corroborated by the   and reinforcing Lalj-sa and Basra against the pos­
     documents. But the documents also give various  sibility of the Portuguese pressing their advan­
     details and explanations which lend an entirely   tage, and especially with the BanI Q:£lid revolt
     different slant to the story*.                  which broke out in Lafrs& upon the collapse of the
       Contrary to the interpretations usually made   campaign. Little information is offered on the
     from the Portuguese sources, the expedition was   military action itself. However, the number of
     not authorized by the Imperial Council in Istan­  men participating must have been about 600 to
     bul. Certainly it was not a case of . . the newly   1,000, with the lower figure being more likely;     j
     formed Persian Gulf units of the Turkish fleet. . .”   perhaps half of these were locally enrolled militia
     attacking Bahrein,57 nor was it one in which . .   (g&n&Uuler).>l The invasion force must have been
     the Turks desired to possess themselves of the   well armed and equipped. The forts at Labsa and
     Arabian ports on the Persian Gulf. . and        al-Iyatlf and their armories were stripped for the
         On the 10th of September orders were dispatched   *• There is no mention in the documents of the “Per­
     to        Pa^a for the return of an 'azeb unit oa loan  sian soldiers" given so prominent a role in the island’s
        bahsA from Basra, and now reported needed by the   defense by Faroughy (Bahrein, p. 63).
     B'jUrbtfx Of Basra (M 3:301-2). Three weeks later, on   *• For an article discussing briefly Mu^afi Papa’s
     t e 1st of October, the first official action was taken by   motives, see §afvet’s "Bahreyn*de bir vaka’a’’, cited
     rstanbui on the raid (the letter to Murftd $&h, governor   above in footnote 15.
     * B*hrein; below p. 492). Istanbul must have      ,l In these early years an attempt was made to main­
      eard °f the campaign, then, no earlier than September   tain 300 gfinUlluUr on the Lahsi rolls: see M 3:1126, 21
        an perhaps as late as the last week of the month,   §a*b£n 967/17 May 1560. The number of men of the
        o^mg no more than two months for transmission from   regular garrison who were at this time detached for
     th. t1° Istanbul and a week for deliberation in council   garrison duty from different Janissary divisions is un­
       e,fC WOU^ place the date of the invasion as roughly   certain, but probably was less than 800. Faria \ Sousa’s
     cariy or mid-July.
                                                     1200 Janissaries and “milice’’ given as “1200 Turks and
       ” doughy, Bahrein, p. 63.
                                                     Janissaries” by Wilson, (Persian Gulf, p. 126) is not
         Wilson, Persian Gulf, p. 126.
                                                     after all, far off.
   242   243   244   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252