Page 146 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

Tribal Rebellion, Marxist Revolution 143

domestic causes, were greatly exacerbated by Britain’s abject surrender of
authority in South Arabia in the closing months of 1967-
Shortly after his accession Qabus ibn Said proclaimed an amnesty for all
rebels in Dhufar who surrendered with their arms. Among the first to come
down from the hills and make their peace with the new sultan were Musallim
ibn Nufl and several members of the original Dhufar Liberation Front. In the

next few months the trickle of defectors grew into a stream, which the leader­
ship of PFLOAG tried to halt by the summary trial and execution of suspected
malcontents. Over 300 Dhufaris were put to death by the Front, either in
Dhufar or in the prison camp at Hauf, and their children were forcibly enrolled
in the Lenin School for ‘re-education’. Qabus’s declared intention of institut­
ing reforms in the government of Oman, and of using the country’s oil reserves

for the benefit of its people, angered PFLOAG even more: the last thing the
Front wanted was a reforming sultan. What worried it most of all, however,
were the steps subsequently taken to intensify the counter-insurgency cam­
paign. A thoroughgoing reorganization of the SAF was set in train, its num­
bers were increased, its equipment improved, and its quality raised by recruit­

ing fighting men from the hill tribes of Oman instead of Baluchi mercenaries as
in the past. To carry through the reorganization of the army and to direct the
intensification of the campaign against the guerrillas, the number of British
army officers and n.c.o.s seconded to the sultan’s forces was greatly
augmented. Members of the Special Air Services Regiment were detached on
duty to help train both the regular and irregular Omani and Dhufari troops,

and to instruct them in counter-insurgency operations, especially behind the
enemy’s lines. There was an expansion, too, in the number of military officers
and pilots, both British and Pakistani, serving on contract with the Omani
forces. Additional aircraft, including helicopters, were acquired, to operate
from the airfield at Salalah controlled by the RAF.

To describe in any detail the course of the subsequent campaign in Dhufar,
or even to compile a reasonably accurate summary of events, is virtually
impossible for want of adequate information. Press reports, which are the
principal available public source, are generally unreliable, most correspon­
dents being unfamiliar with the Omani and Dhufari background, and, in

addition, wholly dependent for their information upon military or
governmental sources. A veil of secrecy was drawn over the war in Dhufar, for
political as well as military reasons. Although it was in many respects justified,
it nevertheless prevented independent observers from making any objective
assessment of the war and its conduct. What follows, therefore, should not be
taken as anything more than a brief outline, subject to error, of events in

Dhufar between 1970 and the close of 1975.
The consequences of the build-up of the Omani forces were not made
apparent to any marked degree in Dhufar until 1973. The fact that such a
uild-up had begun, however, soon forced the PFLOAG general command