Page 150 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

Tribal Rebellion, Marxist Revolution 147

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, the change being accompanied
by a pronunciamento that ‘other forms of struggle’ besides armed conflict were
legitimate pursuits for devout revolutionaries. To show that it had not entirely
lost its bite, the Front set about plotting a new uprising in Oman for the
autumn, to be triggered by the assassination of a prominent figure in Omani
society. Once more weapons and explosives were smuggled into the country,
and an assassination squad was trained by the PFLP in a refugee camp near
Beirut. The plot went awry, however, when the assassination squad, which
included two members of the Front’s general command, was apprehended
near Rastaq at the end of October 1974.
It was calculated at this time that the strength of the PFLO amounted to
about 800 in the People’s Liberation Army and some 1,000 in the People’s
Militia. Most of the PLA were concentrated in western Dhufar, between the
Hornbeam Line and the South Yemen border, and it was in this region that the
S AF and the Persians launched a co-ordinated offensive at the turn of the year.
The Persian assault was directed at Rakhyut on the coast, the only village of
any size in the PFLO’s hands. Rakhyut fell, after some fighting, in January
1975. A month later the 9 June (formerly Che Gueyara) Regiment of the PLA
was brought to battle six miles west of the Hornbeam Line by two battalions of
the SAF, supported by irregulars. It was thoroughly routed, suffering heavy
casualties and the loss of its stores and ammunition. Immediately after the
capture of Rakhyut the Persians began the construction of a second defensive
barrier, the Damavand Line, to the west of Rakhyut, some twenty-five miles
from the ill-defined border with South Yemen. Its purpose was the same as that
of the Hornbeam Line, viz. to interdict the use of the hinterland for the
reinforcement and supply of guerrillas up in the Jabal Qara.
The campaign had now definitely turned in favour of the sultan. King
Hussain of Jordan announced in March 1975 that he was sending an infantry
battalion, an engineer detachment and a squadron of jet fighters to assist the
Omani forces. All had arrived by the following June. The Persian commitment
in men, artillery and aircraft was also maintained, the number of fighting
troops reaching about 3,200 (no definite figures were given out). For all their
willingness and good intentions, however, the Persian troops were not as
effective as they might have been. Indeed, their principal value was to serve as a
tangible demonstration of support for the sultan and as a deterrent to others
who might have been tempted to intervene in the campaign on the insurgents’
side. It was, in some respects, dearly bought support. When on his state visit to
Tehran in March 1974 Qabus was offered by the shah the loan of a squadron of
Phantom aircraft for operations against the insurgents, the offer was made
conditional on the provision of a suitable air base by the Omani government.
As the airfield at Salalah was occasionally waterlogged during the monsoon
months, a new airfield with a 4,000 metre concrete runway was constructed at
Thamarit. Completed at the close of 1974 at a cost of $145 million, it was little