Page 152 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

Tribal Rebellion, Marxist Revolution 149

western Dhufar, Salim Mustahail Ahmad Sarhan. Both were from the Bait
Qatan. A third deserter was Said Salim Huf, the PFLO commander in the

eastern region.
For all practical purposes the war appeared to be over. A cease-fire agree­

ment was concluded between Oman and South Yemen on 11 March 1976
through the mediation of Saudi Arabia, which was then on the verge of
establishing diplomatic relations with the PDRY. The withdrawal of the
Persian military contingent was announced in January 1977, although a year
later there were said to be 1,000 Persian troops still on Omani soil, and Persian
fighter aircraft were still helping to patrol Omani airspace. Sporadic clashes
took place throughout 1976 with the hard core of guerrillas still holding out in
thejabal, and to a lesser extent during 1977. A former leading member of the

PFLO politburo, Salim Musallim al-Awar of the Bait Said section of the Qara,
who deserted in October 1977 and made his way from one of the Front’s camps
in South Yemen to Salalah, estimated that there were then about thirty
guerrillas still active in Dhufar and another 200 being trained, mainly by
Cubans, in South Yemen.
A good deal of the success of the counter-insurgency campaign in Dhufar
was due to the imaginative pacification programme instituted by the sultan’s
government after 1970. As areas were cleared of guerrillas, government teams

set up camp at strategic sites, mostly at watering places which the jabalis used
for their cattle. If adequate water was not available at the sites chosen, wells
were sunk to produce it, much to the joy of the jab all s whose economy was
based upon cattle, water and pasturage. They were further delighted by the
subsequent provision of a medical clinic, school and general store at each
location. Security was entrusted to the firqat (singular firqafi bodies of tribal
irregulars numbering anything from 50 to 150 men each. As time went by, the

firqat came to be composed largely of defectors from the guerrilla forces, who
had come in under successive amnesties and received a cash bonus for doing so.
They were armed and paid by the government, and trained by British instruc­
tors from the SAS Regiment. As the numbers of deserters grew, more firqat
were raised, until by the autumn of 1977 their total numbers were reported to
be over 3,000.
While the firqat have no doubt been effective as a gendarmerie they are also
a potential source of trouble for the government. The fact that their loyalty

has been bought is of little account: the tribesman’s obedience has always
been secured, if it has been secured at all, by bribery or intimidation or the
adroit use of both. What is of more significance is the persistence of tribalism
throughout the^a system. For all PFLOAG’s endless rhetoric about ‘a
peoples revolution’, the fact is that tribal animosities played a major part
in generating the insurgency and in keeping it going thereafter. One factor

PDRvfaClhtated the setting up of base camps and supply depots by the
RY government in Mahra territory was the resentment harboured by the