Page 160 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

Tribal Rebellion, Marxist Revolution 157

of the coterie around Qabus, Tariq was unable to accomplish much in the way
of administrative reform. He was handicapped, too, by his own inability to
attend to the humdrum and repetitive duties of office, to the supervision of his
subordinates, or even to the consolidation of his own position.
Where Tariq was more successful was in breaking down the barriers that had

isolated Oman from the world outside. Through his efforts Oman entered into
diplomatic relations with most of the Arab states and with the major countries
of Europe, Asia and America. Oman also became a member of the Arab League
and the United Nations. At home, however, Tariq could make no headway
against the indifference, perhaps rooted in insecurity and jealousy, of Qabus.
He also ran into the hostility of the palace clique who were jealously deter­

mined to preserve their own power and to deny him the funds, the resources
and even the information he needed to make the office of prime minister a
reality rather than a mockery. Few were surprised when, at the end of 1971, he
resigned and left the country. He and his nephew were subsequently recon­
ciled, and the reconciliation was sealed by the marriage of Qabus to one of
Tariq’s daughters in March 1976. Although the relationship between uncle
and nephew has since developed cordial overtones, Qabus, who is now over
forty years of age, has no heir, and Tariq is the only member of the Al Bu Said

family with the stature to be accepted as heir presumptive. Yet he has not been
allowed to assume the position on Qabus’s right hand for which his talents and
experience fit him, and where Qabus, were he but to acknowledge it, has such
need of him.
Since his accession Qabus has solicited and accepted a great deal of help from

outside. While most of it, especially that given him to conduct the campaign in
Dhufar, was necessary, it may yet raise difficulties for him in the future. Of all
the aid he has received, that from the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Shaikh Zayid ibn
Sultan, is probably the most innocuous. It was Shaikh Zayid, in his capacity as
Abu Dhabi wali in the Buraimi oasis, who filled the vacuum of power left in the
Dhahirah by the suppression of the imamate movement and the subsequent
disinclination of Said ibn Taimur to interest himself actively in the government
of inner Oman. By the time that Zayid succeeded his brother Shakhbut as ruler

of Abu Dhabi in 1966 he was exerting much more authority over the tribes of
the Dhahirah than the sultan himself possessed. Since then, by the distribution
of cash and material aid, his influence has further increased. Yet though he
keeps a watchful eye on the Dhahirah, and has paid for the construction of a
modern highway from Buraimi to Ibri, it is doubtful whether he harbours any
territorial ambitions in the region. His primary concern, which has expressed

itself m grants and loans to the Omani government amounting to well over $300
milh°n in the past half-a-dozen years, has been to preserve stability in inner
Oman and to head off potential trouble from political malcontents.
t ought be thought that the apprehension of common danger from within
and without would draw Oman and the United Arab Emirates into a formal or