Page 161 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

158 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

informal defensive alliance, especially as the sultanate and the former Trucial
Shaikhdoms have many historical ties. Trucial Oman used to be numbered
among the traditional provinces of Oman under the name of al-shamal (‘the
northern’); while the greater part of the shaikhdom of Abu Dhabi, as far as the

Sabkhat Matti, constituted the westernmost province of mediaeval Oman,
al-gharbiyah. But although the past provides a basis of unity between the two it
has also bequeathed a multitude of tribal and religious feuds, political or
dynastic rivalries and territorial disputes, which serve to divide, more than
their mutual interests operate to reconcile, the rulers of the U AE and the Al Bu
Said sultan. While the political and economic developments of the last twenty
years would appear, on the surface, to have robbed these historical differences

of much of their force and relevance, they still persist in the shape of conflicting
claims to jurisdiction over tribes and- territories along the divide between the
sultanate and the UAE. Two centuries ago, in the aftermath of the civil wars
over the Ibadi imamate, the Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah began
raiding across the peninsula to the Gulf of Oman. The consequences of those

early forays are to be seen today in the enclaves of Dibba, Khaur Fakkan and
Kalba, on the coast north of Sauhar, which are appanages of Sharjah. Similar
enclaves belonging to one or other of the northern shaikhdoms lie further
south, in the interior. The Al Bu Said sultans never reconciled themselves to
the loss of these territories, and the sense of injury has persisted to the present
day. Historical causes of dissension aside, personal jealousies and ambitions
render the chances of co-operation between the sultanate and the UAE prob­

lematical. Saiyid Qabus looks upon the federal shaikhs with condescension,
while they, on their side, are unimpressed by his affectations of superiority and
majesty.
A strong desire to prevent the spread of revolutionary infection from the
insurgency in Dhufar has largely motivated Saudi Arabia’s successive grants of

money to Oman since 1971. What the Saudi government has given towards the
cost of the campaign in Dhufar and to cover part of Oman’s growing financial
deficit is unknown, but it cannot be less than $15° million. A further $100
million has been donated for road building and other construction work in
Dhufar, another $100 million to build a copper smelter near Sauhar, and an
undisclosed amount to help pay for arms purchases. It is unlikely, if their past
record is any guide, that the Saudis have not exacted some quid pro quo for eir

contributions. Already, it would seem, they may have succeeded, in discus
sions held in the winter of 1976-7, in pushing their eastern frontier with man
as far as the 56th meridian, which was the line originally claimed by Ibn au in
1935. If so, the concession can only serve to deepen the suspicion wit w 1
many Omanis have regarded the exchanges between Muscat and }a in

recent years. To the Ibadiya of Oman the Saudis have never represen e
anything but a threat - to their religion, to their security and to their in ep
dence. Even those tribesmen who accepted Saudi money and arms in