Page 176 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
P. 176

Sorcerers’ Apprentices                                      173


            with a defence force of only 10,000 men, should have required the amount of
            arms said to be involved in the arrangement was a mystery; unless, as was
            suggested at the time, many of the larger weapons were intended to fill the gaps

            left in Egypt’s armament by the October 1973 war which the Russians
             themselves refused to fill directly. Some of the smaller arms may also in time
             have found their way by circuitous routes to revolutionary or terrorist organ­
             izations. Whatever the Kuwait government’s intentions may have been in
             contracting these engagements, for the Russians they were a positive windfall.
             Kuwait still has the finest harbour in the Gulf, and it still possesses a good deal
             of the strategic significance it possessed at the turn of the century, when it was

             looked upon as a logical terminus for the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. For the
             Russians it offers an attractive alternative to Iraq as an outlet to the Gulf, an
             alternative made all the more feasible by the latent hostility which exists
             between the two countries. Small wonder, therefore, that the former shah
             was reported to have referred with disgust to Kuwait as ‘the Finland of the
             Gulf’.
                According to the Kuwait government, these various transactions with the
             communist bloc are to be interpreted as evidence of Kuwait’s desire to estab­

             lish and preserve her independent and non-aligned status between East and
             West, and of her need to disarm or placate potential adversaries, jealous of her
             prosperity and good fortune. If this is so, what then of the other side of the
             ledger, where Kuwait’s relations with the West are recorded? Certainly the
             bulk of the shaikhdom’s trade and financial dealings have been with the West,
             whether in the sale of her oil, the importation of goods and services or the

             investment of her surplus revenues. They could hardly have been otherwise.
             The Kuwaitis have never lacked business acumen, nor have they allowed
             themselves to be deterred from seeking and exploiting opportunities for profit
             by the kind of considerations which might inhibit other peoples. What pro­
             vokes doubt about Kuwait’s alleged ‘even-handedness’ is not her commercial
             relations with East and West respectively but her political attitudes and
             conduct. While the Kuwait government has been very free with its censures
             and anathemas against the West for its supposed misdeeds, it has been remark­

             ably reticent in commenting upon the activities of the Soviet Union and its
             satellites around the world. Anti-Western diatribes were the standard fare of
             debate in the Kuwait national assembly, which, until its dissolution in August
             1976, fairly rang every day with denunciations of Western, and particularly
             British, ‘imperialism’ - an imperialism, it might be remarked, which had
             profited Kuwait very handsomely in the past and still serves her well today.
             Kuwait has been in the forefront of those states which have pressed for and

             obtained astronomical increases in the price of oil to Western consumers, and
               e voice of its minister of finance and petroleum for most of the decade, Abdur
             Rahman al-Atiqi, has been one of the most strident and malevolent among
               ose raised in vilification of the West - as will be seen more fully later when we
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