Page 179 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
P. 179

176                             Arabia, the Gulf and the West



                         declining to exact their due in any transaction. Nor was it coincidence that the
                         development fund was started in 1961, the year of Kuwait’s independence and
                         of the threatened invasion by Iraq. Given these antecedents, and the steady
                         debasement of political standards in the Arab world since then, it is not
                          surprising that the fund has come to be used for some very questionable

                          ‘development’ purposes. To give money, for instance, as Kuwait has done, to a
                         regime like that of South Yemen, which for the past decade has oppressed its
                         own people, instigated violence and murder abroad and succoured the worst
                         kinds of international terrorist, can only be regarded as futile and worse. Far
                         from placating the regime or persuading it to moderate its excesses, the money
                         merely serves to sustain it while engendering contempt for the donor. Much
                         the same can be said of the subventions to the Palestinian extremists, and the

                         uses to which these are put. Indeed, one of the more bizarre sights among the
                         many incongruous doings on the international stage of late years has been that
                         of the wealthy oligarchs of Kuwait lavishing favours and flattery upon groups
                         bent upon the destruction of the traditional political order to which they
                         themselves belong.

                             Set beside the annual revenues Kuwait derives from oil, and the surplus that
                         has been accumulated from these revenues, the development fund appears as
                         no more than incidental to the financial preoccupations of the shaikhdom. It is
                         also incidental to the economic well-being of the immigrant community, none
                         of whom, as already remarked, is entitled to benefit from the state welfare
                         system or even permitted to own land, businesses or homes in the shaikhdom.
                         The refusal of the Kuwaiti government to provide housing for the Uidanders,

                         or to allow them to buy houses for themselves, is prompted by the calculation
                         that they should not be given any incentive to settle in Kuwait permanently.
                         But many of the Uitlanders have to all intents and purposes already settled
                         there, and others, like the 200,000 Palestinians in the shaikhdom, have no
                         other home. Moreover, Kuwait cannot function without their skills and ser­

                         vices. Yet the cost of living, and of housing in particular, has risen so high as to
                         make it barely worth while for foreigners in the more humble occupations to
                         come to work in Kuwait. Even the highly skilled are no longer assured of a
                         decent living.
                             The Uitlanders’ resentment of the economic disabilities to which they are
                         subjected is sharpened, in the case of the more educated among them, by their
                         also being denied civil or political rights. While they are aware that the various

                         rights and freedoms enumerated in the Kuwaiti constitution are for the most
                         part illusory, the fact that these rights and freedoms are reserved to Kuwaiti
                         citizens rankles. This is especially so in the case of the educated and technically
                         skilled Palestinians and Egyptians, who believe themselves to be more sophis­
                         ticated politically than the enfranchised Bedouin of Kuwait. As the Kuwai

                         government has imposed almost insuperable obstacles in the way °b™"ing
                         Kuwaiti nationality, only a small minority of Palesumans and other Arabs,
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