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Arabia, the Gulf and the West

°.theL rU ing Emilies. It is doubtful, however, whether their efforts at self-
glorification - the latest of which is the foundation at Dauhah of a ‘University of
the Lower Gulf’ - will achieve anything more than to confirm their detractors
in their present opinion.

The methods of government preferred by the Al Thani have always been
rough and ready. Most if not all of them are Wahhabi by religious conviction,
and they share the predilection of their fellow sectarians, the Al Saud, for

arbitrary and condign punishments, even though they do not always emulate
the latter s methods. Although the religious and political restraints to which
Qataris are subject are less severe now than they were a decade ago, they are
still harsher than those in force in any of the other Gulf states outside Saudi
Arabia. Little of the indulgence that is accorded to youthful radicals in Bahrain
and Kuwait is evident in Qatar. The Al Thani rule with a tight rein and they

intend to continue to do so. Though the advisory council provided for in the
temporary constitution of 197° was brought into being after the accession of
Shaikh Khalifah ibn Hamad, it is, like its counterpart the ‘national museum’, a
show without substance, a tame body whose prime purpose is to serve as an
arm of the regime. Whether the Al Thani will be able to keep their strict control

over their subjects in the years ahead is uncertain. As wealth and education
spread, even among limited sections of the populace, as more Qataris
travel abroad, and as material comforts and pleasures continue to captivate
the minds and spirits of the Qataris, they are bound to chafe under the rigid
and cheerless prescriptions of Wahhabism to which they are required to
conform.

While some of the shaikhs of other tribes in Qatar resent the dominance of
the Al Thani, there is little reason to believe that they would ever express this
resentment actively. It is much the same with the bulk of the immigrant
population, who are seemingly content to make their living from the country
without being troubled by an itch to share in its political life. Of course there

are a number of restless spirits about, especially among the emigre Arabs and
the minority of educated or semi-educated Qataris; but they would have no
hope of challenging the supremacy of the Al Thani without the backing of an
armed force. Both the small Qatari defence force and the police are firmly
urider the regime’s control. They have few Qataris in their ranks: the police are
mostly Baluchis and the defence force is comprised in the main of Omani,

Dhufari and Yemeni mercenaries. Some signs of disaffection appeared among
them in 1973-4, which resulted in the dismissal of a few score soldiers and their
replacement by fresh recruits. If the defence force should become involved in
politics, it is more likely to be in support of one or other contending factions of
the Al Thani - there are at least three rival branches of the dynasty - than as the
spearhead of a revolutionary^/, designed to overthrow the regime. What may

be predicted with some certainty, in view of the close ties that have subsisted
for many years between the Al Thani and the Al Saud, is that the Saudi