Page 208 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
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Sorcerers’ Apprentices                                      205



         ascendancy over them. Rashid and Saqr have striven, therefore, as much for
         reasons of practical politics as from a historical compulsion to offset Zayid’s
         influence in the federal supreme council, though Saqr’s opposition has been
          tempered by his need for the financial benefits that membership of the federa­
         tion affords him. Zayid’s only real ally in the supreme council has been Shaikh
          Sultan of Sharjah. He, like his brother, the late Shaikh Khalid, before him, has
         profited from Zayid’s bounty, and in turn he has frequently been used by Zayid

         as a stalking-horse for pushing through new measures to strengthen the
         federation.
            If the federation survives, it will be despite the indifference and contumacy
         of the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai. Shaikh Saqr would dearly like to
         cut loose from the federation and to recapture for Ras al-Khaimah its past glory

         as the leading power on the coast. But his resources, economic or otherwise,
         forbid this course of action, leaving him little option but to continue to look to
         Zayid as his financial patron. Shaikh Rashid is contemptuous of Abu Dhabi’s
         pretensions as the leader of the federation, and exasperated by the incompe­
          tence and financial waste displayed by the federal administration. Yet while he
         cynically evades his financial and other responsibilities to the federation,
         preferring to devote himself to the single-minded pursuit of his own interests,

          he continues to milk the federation for the advantages it affords him. What is
         true of Rashid is also true of the other rulers: it is only selfish interest and the
         need for mutual security that unites them, and in the last resort holds the
         federation together.
            Under the constitution of the UAE responsibility for the defence of the
         federation is vested in a higher defence council, headed by the president and

         consisting of the vice-president, the prime minister, the ministers of defence
         and the interior, and the commander of the Union Defence Force. The UDF
         has evolved from the former Trucial Oman Scouts, an infantry battalion
         organized in mobile squadrons which was first raised by the British in the
         early 1950s for internal security duties. Although the UDF has now grown to
         brigade strength, with roughly 5,000 men supported by artillery and

         armoured vehicles, its development has been partly stultified by the parallel
         development of the much larger and better equipped Abu Dhabi Defence
         Force. The ADDF has a strength of 18,000 men - mobile infantry units,
         artillery, armoured vehicles, helicopters, fighter and transport jet aircraft
         and naval patrol boats. Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah have much smaller armed

          orces, the former’s numbering perhaps 2,500, the latter’s about 500. Up to
         t e time of its transfer to the UAE the Trucial Oman Scouts had British
         regular officers seconded from the British army, as well as several dozen
           ntish n.c.o.s, and provision was made in the treaty of friendship concluded
           etween Britain and the UAE in December 1971 for the continued second-
                ° • °J^cers and n.c.o.s. In the years since then, however, the proportion
               ritish officers and n.c.o.s in the Union Defence Force has steadily
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