Page 212 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

Sorcerers’ Apprentices 209

eldest (some say the eldest), a decade later. Shakhbut had two sons, Said and
Sultan, both of whom died in their twenties. Zayid himself is about sixty years
of age. His eldest son, Khalifah, who was born in 1949, is the putative heir
apparent, although Zayid himself seems to hold his second son, Sultan, born in
1953, in higher esteem. His other sons have not yet reached adult age. A certain
degree of jealousy exists between the Band Sultan (Zayid’s and Shakhbut’s)
branch of the Al Nihayan and the Bani Khalifah branch, the descendants of
Khalifah, reputedly the eldest son of Zayid ibn Khalifah. Khalifah’s son,

Muhammad, a cousin of Zayid and Shakhbut ibn Sultan, sired half a dozen or
more sons, who today occupy prominent positions in either the Abu Dhabi
administration or the government of the UAE. Two of them, at least, are said
to have their hearts set upon achieving greater prominence. Succession in the
Al Nihayan line has never been determined by primogeniture; it has been the

strongest candidate, or the candidate with the strongest tribal support, who has
succeeded, and more often than not the issue has been decided by the sword.
Against the background of fratricide and parricide which colours the history of
the Al Nihayan, the chances of another bloody upheaval in the family at some
future date appear far from remote.
The chief potential threat to the continued rule of the Al Nihayan would
seem to be that of a coup d’etat by the northern Arab emigres. The obvious

counter to such a threat, at least at first glance, is the Abu Dhabi Defence
Force, which is fully capable of crushing any bid for power by the emigre Arabs,
if they were acting alone. It is fairly certain, however, that the emigre Arabs,
effendis to a man, would not act without armed support, and this they do not
have, despite the existence within Abu Dhabi, as in the other shaikhdoms, of

underground cells of the PFLO and its sister organization, the Popular
Revolutionary Movement, another Marxist offshoot of the ANM. The possi­
bility of the armed overthrow of the ruling house, therefore, would seem to
depend upon the A DDF itself, or a sizable portion of it, becoming disaffected
and attempting a coup, either alone or in combination with the subversive
elements among the northern Arabs.
Should an emigre or army coup be attempted in Abu Dhabi it is highly

doubtful whether the local tribesmen, assuming their fealty to the ruler to be
unchanged, would be as capable as they once were of effectively resisting it. It
is also doubtful, given the strains within the federation, whether the other
federal rulers would employ the Union Defence Force (assuming that its own
ranks had not by then been infected with politics) to try to restore the Al
Nihayan to power. Yet if they did not resist the overthrow of one shaikhly

house by an emigre or military coup, the survival of their own houses would be
endangered. Amid all these uncertainties one thing is clear, and this is that any
revolutionary change in the UAE will be accompanied by considerable
loodshed. The history of the former Trucial Coast is one of raiding and
s mushing, piracy and pillage; the razzia and the blood feud are a way of life