Page 321 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

318 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

grounds that it would encourage the Russians to follow suit - as if the Russians
needed any instruction in such matters. Over the next half-a-dozen years the
American naval agreement with Bahrain was subject to the customary vagaries
of Arab politics, with the shaikh of Bahrain announcing at times of tension the
imminent cancellation of the agreement, and then, after the vociferations of his
nationalist critics had died down, quietly allowing it to continue. The shah’s
petulant complaints about the American naval squadron persisted, inspired by

his irritation at the thought that it might one day inhibit his own navy’s
movements. He would not have dared to bait the Soviet Union in the same
fashion, but he was emboldened to do so in the case of the United States
because of the irresolution which that country had been displaying in the
conduct of her foreign policy since the debacle in Vietnam. He was also
encouraged by the way in which his complaints were endorsed by gullible or
foolish Western politicians. For instance, in November 1975 the British
foreign secretary, James Callaghan, gave it as his opinion, during a brief stop in
Bahrain, that the United States would be well advised to relinquish its rights of
visit and supply at Jufair. ‘There is no real justification for an American
presence in the Gulf,’ he declared rotundly, ‘especially if the Gulf can co­
operate to protect its own areas.’ Neither Callaghan nor the shah, it might be
remarked in passing, is on record as having criticized the use by the Soviet
Union of naval facilities at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.
Western opinion in general throughout the 1970s was content to accept the
shah at his own valuation, even to the point of acquiescing in his claim that the

best guarantee for the preservation of Western interests in the Gulf lay in the
establishment of a Persian ascendancy. The evident military and economic
superiority of Persia over the other states of the region was constantly cited by
Western politicians, government officials and professional pundits as solid
grounds for this belief; and the argument was frequently bolstered by optimis­
tic assertions about the Soviet Union’s having an equal interest with the West
in promoting a Persian paramountcy in the Gulf, since the Russians, so it was
alleged, were anxious to remain on good terms with the shah so as to safeguard
their own economic interests in Persia, especially in the continuing supply of
natural gas from the Khuzistan and other fields. Such speculation was merely
whistling in the dark. Persia was not a power of any consequence, nor could her

ability to command the Gulf be taken as self-evident. As for Russian policy
towards Persia, this could only be deduced from the history of the past two
centuries, not from the events of the last two decades. For the Soviet Union,
Persia represents a far superior means of access to the Gulf and the Indian
Ocean than any other, and in the final assessment Persia as a power is incapa e
of denying the Russians anything.

The fates never permitted Muhammad Reza Shah to win the guerdon of wide
renown and far dominion that he craved, still less to achieve his dream 0