Page 397 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

394 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

week of June, made no secret of what the Arab oil slates would like to do if they
thought they could bring it off. He repealed his remarks at a conference in

London organized by the Financial Tinies in the third week of September. The
Arabs, Pachachi told his audience, were fully prepared to exploit the world’s
pressing need for their oil to achieve not only ever higher financial returns but
also their political ends, chief among which was the withdrawal of Israel from
occupied Arab territory. ‘The Arabs now hold the keys to the energy and
monetary crisis,’ Pachachi declared. ‘They will know how to use both as a

political weapon to enforce a just settlement in the Middle East on the United
States administration that still believes might is right.’ The method used would
be the imposition of restrictions upon crude-oil production. As Pachachi saw
it,

The balance between demand and supply has become extremely delicate and precari­
ous. Interruption of supply or a slow-down in the expansion of production of one major
supplier could cause a serious energy crisis in a short time. . . . The present crude oil
production levels in the Arab countries are sufficient and adequate to meet the economic
and financial needs of the Arab producing countries, particularly in the current situa­
tion of rising prices. Is there a better investment for any Arab oil-producing country
than conserving the oil wealth which they do not need at present for future generations?
Oil in the ground is more valuable as an investment than bonds and securiues in the
present uncertainties prevailing in the world monetary system.

For all this, however, Pachachi went on to assure his listeners.

Arab oil, considering the current political and economic challenges of the West, might
be regarded as the most secure source of imported energy. I do not need to remind you
that even at the height of the pre-Tehran crisis, when oil companies refused to comply
with the reasonable demands of OPEC countries, no interruption of supplies to
consumers was ever contemplated.

As an assurance it was cold comfort, as well as a striking departure from the
true facts concerning OPEC’s behaviour in December 1970 and January 1971
- as Pachachi, who had been secretary-general of the organization at the time,

was in a better position than most to know. In view of this, his further
assurance on the subject of a possible embargo - ‘We need not deny oil supply
to any country in the world. We do not need to impose an oil embargo or a
boycott against any country. An embargo against one or more countries is
neither practical nor effective’ - was not of a nature to inspire confidence, or

even credence, in his listeners.
At the time that Pachachi was hawking his hollow promises aroun
capitals of Europe, Egypt and Syria were making their final preparations; or
war with Israel. Oil had already been selected as one of the principal stra g
weapons in the Arab armoury, particularly to deter the Western power ro
intervening in the conflict on Israel’s behalf. On 26 August Anwar al-Sadatna

paid a visit to Faisal to apprise him of his military plans and to seek assu