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The ‘Sting* 395

of financial aid. At the meeting the use of Saudi Arabia’s oil to bring pressure to
bear upon the United States, should the need arise, was also discussed, with

what definite result is not known for certain. From the subsequent actions of
the Saudi government, however, and from Faisal’s own conversations with the
heads of ARAMCO in May, it is logical to infer, at the very least, that Faisal
did not reject the idea of a resort to this expedient. At the end of August he was
visited by the ruler of Kuwait, Sabah ibn Salim Al Sabah, who afterwards went
on to Cairo to see Sadat. Before he left Cairo Shaikh Sabah indicated his
willingness to throw Kuwait’s oil into the balance in the forthcoming battle

with Israel.
For all these furtive comings and goings, clandestine preparations and
surreptitious undertakings, what was still uppermost in the calculations of the
governments of the Arab oil states in the early autumn of 1973 was substantial
price increases. The financial cutting edge of the oil weapon was as vital to its
effectiveness as the imposition of restrictions upon production. Principle and
profit, they reckoned, could be combined in harmonious union: oil production

would be reduced to persuade the Western powers to turn against Israel; and
prices could be increased to compensate for any loss of revenue from reduced
output - and at the same time provide the funds with which to exert further
economic pressure upon the industrial nations. It was an enchanting prospect
and the auguries all seemed favourable.

The Yom Kippur war broke out on 6 October and two days later the Gulf
members of OPEC met the representatives of the oil companies at Vienna. The
first move against the companies had already been made on 7 October when
Iraq had nationalized the shareholding of Esso and Mobil in the Basra
Petroleum Company-a move which was, in a legal sense, nugatory, since B PC
was a British company. At Vienna the delegates of the six Gulf oil states, led by
Yamani and Amuzegar, demanded an immediate increase in the government

lax rate which would have been equivalent to doubling the posted price of Gulf
oil from around $3 to $6 a barrel. The oil companies’ representatives, still
negotiating as one under business review letters from the United States
Department of Justice, were empowered to offer no more than a 25 per cent
increase in the posted price. Yamani and Amuzegar came down to $5 a barrel,
which the companies’ chief negotiators, Piercy of Esso and Andre Benard of
Shell, passed on to their boards in New York and London. The companies as a

whole were appalled by the financial implications of such a huge increase,
implications which, they believed, were potentially so momentous that they
could not by themselves take the responsibility for reaching a decision. Such a
decision could only be made in consultation with the governments of the
industrial nations, and Piercy and Benard were instructed to reply in this sense
to the OPEC delegates. The two negotiators conveyed the message to Yamani
on the night of 10 October. It was, for all practical purposes, the end of the