Page 41 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

34 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

duty for acting improperly. A rumour that they had been arrested and dis­
missed sparked off a brief riot in the cantonments of the South Arabian Army
on the morning of 20 June. The noise of the riot in turn alarmed a South
Arabian Police detachment in a neighbouring barracks. Taking the sound of
gunfire to mean that British troops were being used to subdue the rioters, the
police detachment ran amok and fired on a passing British army vehicle,
killing eight soldiers. Word of the mutiny quickly reached Crater, where a state
of hysteria, brought on by the terrorists’ campaign and mortification at the
Israeli victory over the Arab armies, already reigned. The Aden police in
Crater promptly threw in their lot with the mutineers and ambushed two
patrols of the 1st Battalion. Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and the Queen’s
Dragoon Guards, who were responsible for security in Crater. A dozen British
officers and men were killed, and further casualties were inflicted upon the
troops sent in to try to recover the bodies of their slain comrades. When the day
ended, a total of twenty-two British soldiers were dead and thirty-one more had
been wounded, not in open battle but as a result of treachery.
Two courses were now open to the high commissioner. One was to let the
federal forces - the South Arabian Army and the Armed Police - restore order
in Crater, where the terrorists had come out into the streets and were in control
of most of the town. At the request of the federal government, British troops
had subdued the rioters and mutineers in the army cantonment and police
barracks within hours, and they had done so with such disciplined skill and
restraint that although they suffered a few casualties themselves they inflicted
none upon the federal soldiers or police. So impressed were the latter by the
forbearance shown them, and so smitten were they with remorse for what had
occurred on 20 June, that they badly wanted a chance to redeem their honour
and their reputation. Within Crater only a minority of the police (and they were
mainly NLF sympathizers) had taken part in the slaying of the British troops.
The majority, frightened and dismayed by the bloodshed, were still loyal. One
Arab police officer had saved the life of a British soldier caught in an ambush,
while another had recovered the bodies of the slain officers and men and
handed them over to the British authorities. To rely upon the South Arabian
Army and Police to recapture Crater with or without British assistance, was
certainly a risk; but if one of Trevelyan’s aims was, as he had said it was, to
support and strengthen the federal authorities, it was a risk that was well worth
taking.
The second course was to order the British Army to re-enter Crater immedi­
ately and reassert British authority. This would have been the most natural
action to take, not only in military terms but also for the sake of the troops’
morale. It was the course of action favoured by the overwhelming majority of
the British officers and men in Aden, and notably by Lieutenant-Colonel Colin
Mitchell, the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, which was in the process of relieving the 1st Battalion, Royal