Page 44 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

The Abandonment of Aden 37

nationalists, the NLF and FLOSY. Though the ministers, most of whom
were federal rulers, were reluctant to follow this advice, which was hardly
surprising seeing that the two terrorist organizations were dedicated to their
overthrow, they empowered the federal minister of information, Husain Alt
Bayumi of Aden, to form a more broadly-based cabinet. He found the task
well-nigh impossible, for the NLF and FLOSY threatened to kill anyone who
co-operated with him. In the last week of July the federal ministers instructed
Bayumi to abandon his efforts. For Trevelyan this was the last straw. ‘Our
attempt to strengthen the Federal Government had failed. We could do no
more for them.’
All British troops had been withdrawn from the protectorate states by the
end of June. Henceforth the federal rulers were to be left to fend for them­
selves, which was just as Trevelyan thought it should be.

We had no responsibility under the Treaties which we were unilaterally abrogating on
independence, except to support the Rulers against attack from outside the country.
Internal security was the Rulers’ responsibility. . . . We had to stick to the decision to
withdraw. We were not going to create a little Vietnam.

What is missing from this prim summation is any indication that towards the
close of June the date of the final evacuation from Aden had been quietly
advanced, on Trevelyan’s recommendation, by two months, to 20 November
1967. Though Whitehall wanted the decision kept secret (on the grounds that
its publication would hasten the disintegration of the federation), it leaked out
within weeks, as Trevelyan had foreseen it would. He took a rather idio­
syncratic view of the consequences of the disclosure. ‘So we were able to put
the dissidents on notice that they could not go on indulging in the luxury of
shooting us and avoiding responsibility for much longer.’
Now that the NLF was certain that the British were really withdrawing and
would not venture again into the interior, it opened its final offensive to topple
the federal rulers. The offensive met with astonishing success. One after
another, throughout the month of August, the protectorate states were overrun
by the NLF guerrillas, until by the close of the month no fewer than twelve of
the amirates and sultanates of the Western Protectorate were in NLF hands.
To ihis day it is impossible, for want of detailed and reliable information, to

account for the NLF’s success. Several of the rulers were absent from their
states at the lime: some were in Geneva, at the request of the British govern­
ment, to talk to the UN special mission (which was still wandering vaguely
about); one was in hospital in London; another was in Saudi Arabia seeking
support. The South Arabian Army refused to stir from its cantonments and
outlying garrisons in the protectorate to help the federal government or its own
filers. It remained inert, presumably awaiting the call to a nobler destiny.
Certainly it received no prodding to bestir itself from the higher British
military and civil authorities, who seemed to be preoccupied with adhering to