Page 48 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

The Abandonment of Aden 41

return that their lives would be forfeit if they ventured to set foot in their
former capitals. So they chose exile in Saudi Arabia instead. The sultan of
Qishn and Socotra suffered a similar fate.
Throughout September and October, while the British Army tried to afford
to the distracted populace of Aden the protection and security which it is the
duty of any civilized government to afford its subjects, even those it is about to
forsake, the representatives of the British government scurried backwards and
forwards between FLOS Y and the NLF, frantically trying to decide to which
of these rival terrorist gangs they should transfer the symbols of authority and
sovereignty over Aden. Their choice fell upon the NLF, even before the final
defeat of FLOSY in the first week of November. The Foreign Office had
expressed itself in favour of approaching the NLF as early as the beginning of
September, when Trevelyan paid his flying visit to London. The high commis­
sioner, it may be recalled, had recommended soon after his appointment that
the proscription on the NLF as an illegal organization be lifted, especially as it
was doubtful, he believed, that the NLF had any communist affiliations. The
idea of handing over Aden to the NLF, which would automatically cancel the
commitments made earlier to the federal government to keep air and naval
forces in South Arabian waters for a period after independence, appealed to
more than one member of the Cabinet. Richard Crossman, the lord president
of the council and leader of the House of Commons, thought it ‘first rate’ and
so, too, if he is to be believed, did other members of the Overseas Political and
Defence Committee of the Cabinet. George Wigg, the paymaster general, and
George Brown thought otherwise. To Wigg the impending abandonment of
Aden was a ‘disaster’, a betrayal of everyone who had put his trust in Britain.
Brown was unhappy that the plans he had put forward in June were to be
scrapped, now that the federal government no longer existed. Yet despite this
nagging sense of disquiet at leaving Aden in the condition it was in, he did not
hold out against his colleagues and insist upon a reconsideration.
On 30 October the Cabinet confirmed the decision to evacuate Aden during
November and to enter into negotiations with the NLF - if they could be
enticed to the conference table - for the transfer of power. Crossman was
delighted: ‘Really we’ve been miraculously lucky in Aden - cancelling all our
obligations and getting out without a British soldier being killed.’ Trevelyan
echoed the sentiments:

It was by this time obvious that we only had the choice to hand over to the NLF or to
no ody. We were lucky in at last finding someone to whom we might be able to hand
over in peace. ... Our stores were all away. There was nothing to keep us. It was better
tor us to go as soon as possible.

On 2 November Brown announced the Cabinet’s decision to the House of
ommons. Its immediate effect in Aden was to provoke the final, bloody
struggle for supremacy betweenFLOSYandtheNLF already described. The