Page 468 - Arabia the Gulf and the West
P. 468

Gazelles and Lions 465



          proposed to control them by making them dependent for arms and other
          supplies upon the revolutionary government in Tabriz.
            The Soviet attempt to detach the ‘republics’ of Azerbaijan and Mahabad
         from Persia and to erect them into strategic outposts for future use was
         accompanied by a determined Soviet diplomatic offensive against Turkey. In

          March 1945 the Soviet government denounced the Russo-Turkish treaty of
         friendship of 1925, and in the months that followed let it be known that it
          would not be satisfied with anything less than the grant of military bases in the
          Bosporus and Dardanelles, together with the institution of a new regime of the
          straits which would amount to their being placed under Russian control. A

         demand was also preferred for the cession of the provinces of Kars and
          Ardahan in eastern Turkey.
            The dual Soviet offensive against Turkey and Persia failed, partly but not

          entirely because the Russians overplayed their hand. The Turks stood firm,
          encouraged by Britain and the United States; and when in February 1947 the
          British government informed the United States that it could no longer afford to
          supply military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman
          announced the following month that the United States would assume the task

          herself. Five years later Turkey’s accession to NATO made the question of the
          straits an issue central to the defence of Western Europe, thereby checkmating
          the Russians. The crisis caused by the retention of Russian troops in northern
          Persia was resolved in May 1946 when the troops were withdrawn, following

          remonstrances by the British and United States governments and an appeal by
          the Persians to the newly created UN Security Council. Exactly why the
          Russians chose to withdraw is not entirely clear, even today. The explanation
          usually offered is that they were swayed both by the strength of the British and
          American protests and by their desire to retain the oil concession for northern
          Persia, which they had extracted from the Persian government as the price of

          their leaving. It is also possible, however, that a decisive influence was exerted
          upon the Russians’ calculations by the realization that their behaviour in Persia
          was having adverse effects upon their diplomatic activities elsewhere. What­

          ever the reason, the Russians evacuated northern Persia, and before 1946 was
          out the Persian government had reasserted its authority over Azerbaijan and
            ahabad. The following October, emboldened by the decision of the United
           tates government earlier in the month to send a military mission to the Persian
          ari^’ t^le Persians cancelled the Soviet oil concession outright.
                e dissolution of the Indian empire in 1947 brought an end to Britain’s role

          ?S a Muslim and Oriental power. It also deprived Persia of her principal
             ttress against the encroachment of Russia. However, the assumption by the
            nited States, through the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, of

                          f°r the military and economic support of Greece and Turkey,
          old 6 extens*on this responsibility to Persia later in 1947, meant that the
              system of barrier powers to restrain the southward advance of Russia still
   463   464   465   466   467   468   469   470   471   472   473