Page 473 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

470 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

affected to regard, first the South Arabian League and then the Aden People’s
Socialist Party, as the leaders of the struggle for independence. They never

seemed to grasp the fact that from 1963 onwards the running was being made
by the NLF, and to a lesser extent by FLO SY; so that when the NLF
emerged at the end of 1967 as the new masters of Aden and South Arabia, the
Kremlin was taken by surprise. It was also uncertain of the character of the new

regime, even though some of the NLF leadership were quick to show their
Marxist-Leninist colours. Another factor inhibiting the Russians’ approach to
the NLF regime was the prompt appearance on the scene of their ideological
rivals, the Chinese, with offers of technical aid for the new republic and

support for the insurgency in Dhufar. Though the Russians lost little time in
making comparable offers, they still hesitated to clasp the NLF leadership in a
fraternal embrace, even after the Marxist-Leninist faction within it had over­
thrown its opponents and proclaimed its intention to build a society based

upon the principles of ‘scientific socialism’ in South Yemen.
Moscow’s reluctance to give its ideological imprimatur to the South Yemeni
revolution was based primarily upon practical considerations. Ideological
approval implied a willingness to provide economic, political and even military

assistance, especially if the standing of the Soviet Union as the true and
legitimate heir of Marx and Lenin, and the dynamic centre of world commun­
ism, was not to be impaired. Yet a commitment to a country such as South
Yemen, virtually bankrupt and highly unstable, could well prove very costly

financially and extremely embarrassing politically. The uncomfortable lesson
of Cuba, with all that it had entailed in the way of incalculable economic and
political liabilities incurred in haste, was still very much in the forefront of the
Soviet government’s mind a decade later. It was also uncertain of how the
Western powers might react if it were to make a client of South Yemen.

Moscow was still digesting the implications of Britain’s withdrawal from Aden
in 1967 and her proclaimed intention to leave the Gulf in 1971. It seemed to the
Kremlin inconceivable that the United States would not compel the British to
change their minds, still less that the Americans would sit idly by and allow the

Soviet Union to occupy Britain’s former base at Aden.
Britain’s action in quitting the Gulf at the end of 1971 removed most of the
Kremlin’s doubts and hesitations about the wisdom of becoming involved in
South Yemen. What few misgivings remained were completely dispelled.two

years later by the panic displayed by the Western powers in the wake 0 t e
Arab oil embargo of October 1973- Developments in South Yemen itse a so
played into the Russians’ hands. The Aden regime had by this time manage
alienate not only the Western powers but the conservative Arab regime

well, thereby cutting itself off from two potential sources of aid to aiie
South Yemen’s desperate economic condition. The Chinese could not c
with the Soviet Union in the provision of material goods and arms
the radical Arab states, like Libya, and the Soviet Union and her E P