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Gazelles and Lions                                        471


           satellites as the only possible countries to which South Yemen could turn for
           succour. At the same time the Aden politburo was experiencing growing

           difficulty in maintaining its hold upon the country, especially as it was fre­
           quently distracted by outbreaks of feuding within its own ranks.
              As every ruler of South Arabia since time began has learned, the only way in
           which order and authority can be imposed upon the country is by the ruthless

           and widespread application of force. The British never attempted, or wished to
           attempt, to enforce their rule outside Aden colony in this fashion, with the
           result that they have since been criticized for having left the hinterland, the
           former Aden Protectorate, in as backward a condition as they found it. Its
           perversion of the truth apart, the criticism is misconceived; for if Britain had

           employed the measure of severity necessary to subdue the inhabitants of South
           Arabia and cause them to abandon their age-old pursuits of rapine, slaughter
           and brigandage, not to mention their cherished superstitions, tribal customs

           and primitive social habits, she would have been execrated by enlightened
           opinion everywhere. Unlike the British, the NLF politburo had no compunc­
           tion about endeavouring to crush the resistance of the tribesmen of South
           Yemen. Moreover, being iMarxist-Leninist and therefore counted among the
           ‘progressive’ regimes of the world, it provoked no outraged protests in

          enlightened circles about the methods it used in erecting the grotesquerie of a
           Marxist-Leninist state in southern Arabia. Its only real problems were those
          created by its own limited economic resources, a lack of arms and deficiencies
          in modern techniques of repression.

             All of these were supplied in increasing quantities by the Soviet Union and
          her allies from the mid-1970s onwards. For the Russians it was a small price to
          pay to secure access to Aden’s incomparable strategic location, commanding at
          one and the same time the passage of the Red Sea, the southern gates of Arabia
          and the Horn of Africa. The benefits accruing to both partners to the arrange­

          ment were complementary. As the National Front regime was enabled to
          employ more brutal and effective methods for the subjugation of its people, so
          also the Soviet grip on Aden and South Yemen progressively tightened. The

          army was placed under the de facto command of Soviet officers, while the
          popular militia was trained by Cubans. East Germans, eventually to the
          number of 2,000, were brought in to take charge of the police and security
          services. They proceeded to introduce their own methods of dealing with
          P° itical dissidents, including the setting up of concentration camps for the

          J— °f real or suspected opponents of the regime. A South Yemeni air
             rce was created, the aircraft being supplied by the Soviet Union, the air and
          ground crews by Cuba.

          of df °UtSet J978 South Yemen had progressed from being a client state
                   ov’et Union to the status, for all practical purposes, of a Soviet colony.
          basef °?ner RAF station at Khormaksar, outside Aden, now an operational
                 Or t e Soviet air force, were located the Russian military and intelligence
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