Page 506 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

Gazelles and Lions
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of economic dislocation but also, through the deployment of Arab oil money,
of the corruption of Western society and its institutions. Yet Western

governments have been reluctant to acknowledge the existence of this danger,
preferring to seek refuge in optimistic arguments and predictions about the
behaviour of Persia and the Arab oil states which are based, not upon their

history, their political philosophies or their religious beliefs but upon Western
ideas of moderation and good sense, reasonableness and sober judgement,
power and responsibility, to none of which the states in question actively

subscribe.
The same malaise of spirit has led Europe to resign the care of its strategic
interests in Arabia and the Gulf, as well as in the Middle East at large, to the

United States, even though the United States, for a generation and more, has
considered herself as much the rival as the ally of the European powers in the
area, and has regulated her conduct there in conformity with this view. Nor

should it be overlooked that in the struggle between the European imperial
powers and the forces of nationalism in Asia and Africa over the past half-

century, the United States has unremittingly thrown her influence into the
scales against the European empires. It is unwise, therefore, to say the least, for
Europe to continue to rely upon the United States for the defence of its great
interests in the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government, as we

have seen, has pursued a futile policy of entrusting the security of the Gulf to
Persia and Saudi Arabia. Now one of these pillars has collapsed and the

strength of the other is highly questionable. Since the United States does not
have the same fundamental need of the Gulf’s oil as do Europe and Japan, it is
unlikely, in the final analysis, that she would be prepared to take the possibly
desperate measures that may be required to retain control over it for the West,

especially in view of both the neo-isolationist sentiment which has surfaced in
the United States since the defeat of American arms in Vietnam, and the want
vigour and firmness which has in consequence characterized American

actions abroad.
It is abundantly clear that Europe and Japan must themselves assume

responsibility for the protection of their interests in the Gulf. They must do so
as much for reasons of honour and self-respect as out of self-interest; for the
nited States cannot and should not be left to carry the burden alone. Deter-
rrunation, flexibility, resource and skill will all be required if the Western

jL Wers 3nd JaPan are to safeguard their very great economic and strategic

wj? *n against the arbitrary and violent shifts of political fortune
und h aVe always marked the course of the Gulf’s history, and which will
rern°U recJly continue to mark it in the future. The key to mastery of the Gulf

to oninS as ** has always been, command of the sea. Britain and Japan, and
Powe y 3 fSSer de8ree> France and Germany, have in the recent past been naval
other^h0 l^e rank- There is nothing intrinsic in their condition today,

an their will and sense of purpose, to prevent them in combination