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The Retreat from the Gulf 67

reasoning, then, the Foreign Office suggested, she might have to be reminded
that her existence as an independent state depended upon British protection,
and that this protection would only be continued on British terms, which
meant accepting a British definition of her frontiers. If a frontier were not
agreed upon, the British government might find it extremely difficult in the
future to uphold Abu Dhabi’s rights to the hinterland, where oil might
possibly be found. It was therefore greatly to Abu Dhabi’s advantage, so the
Foreign Office contended, to reach an agreed settlement of the frontier by
ceding Khaur al-Udaid to Saudi Arabia - even more so if Ibn Saud were
subsequently to undertake not to claim any territorial rights beyond that
frontier.
The validity of the argument, and of the premises on which it was based, was
strongly questioned by the India Office. In its view Ibn Saud had already been
offered in the Riyad Line a reasonable frontier - in fact a most generous one
considering the actual extent of his effective jurisdiction in eastern Arabia. The
British government, the India Office believed, should stick to this offer and not
allow Ibn Saud to use it as a basis for extracting new concessions. He had no
right to Khaur al-Udaid, and even if it were to be transferred to him as a sop to
his ambition, there was no guarantee that in return he would agree to a definite
frontier with Abu Dhabi and respect it afterwards. Appeasement was both
objectionable in principle and unavailing in practice. From the evidence of
Britain’s past dealings with Ibn Saud it was patently clear that he would
inevitably use any concession made to him as a lever with which to try to obtain
further concessions. Even if he were to be induced to give an undertaking
to respect an agreed frontier, the worth of such a pledge was open to
serious doubt. Oil and revenue were what he was seeking, and if he failed to
find oil at Khaur al-Udaid or in its vicinity, he might well decide to advance
claims to territory further afield - wherever, in fact, along the southern
shores of the Gulf oil companies might show an interest in prospecting for
oil.
Unabashed by the India Office’s strictures, the Foreign Office pressed ahead
with its plans to buy Ibn Saud’s co-operation over Palestine. A change of
direction in the conduct of British foreign policy took place after Halifax
replaced Eden as foreign secretary in February 1938 and Sir Robert Vansit­
tart s appointment as adviser on foreign affairs to the Cabinet was terminated.
At the insistence of G. W. (later Sir George) Rendel, the head of the Eastern
Department, the question of Khaur al-Udaid was removed from the normal

processes of interdepartmental consultation from March 1938 onwards and
dealt with by the Foreign Office alone. In July 1938 the Foreign Office’s

proposals for settling the issue were put before the Cabinet. No decision was
taken upon them, but the Foreign Office did not lose heart. Two months later,
at the time of the Munich crisis, it made another effort to obtain the Cabinet’s
approval. This time its attempt was frustrated by the opposition of the secre-