Page 74 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

The Retreat from the Gulf 7'

refused point-blank to entertain the suggestion in 1935 and the Foreign Office,
with evident reluctance, was forced to reject it. Now, in August 1951 > when the
suggestion was again put forward, the Foreign Office accepted it. It also agreed
to Faisal’s demand that movements of the Trucial Oman Levies (later Scouts),

the British-officered force of tribesmen under the command of the political
resident in the Gulf which was responsible for internal security in the Trucial
Shaikhdoms, should be restricted to areas which were not in dispute. For their
part the Saudis undertook to refrain from activities which might prejudice the
work of the proposed frontier commission.
No sooner had they given this undertaking than they set about bribing and

inciting the leaders of tribes in and around the Buraimi oasis to declare
themselves Saudi adherents. The success of their efforts led them in August
1952, a year after the Amir Faisal’s visit to London, to dispatch an armed party
across the Dhafrah to seize and occupy one of the villages in the Buraimi oasis.
As the force was led by a former governor of Ras Tanura, the oil-loading

terminal on the Hasa coast, no one was greatly surprised that the party
travelled in transport provided by ARAMCO. When the sultan of Muscat,
who controlled three of the villages in the oasis, gathered a large force of
tribesmen to eject the interlopers, the Saudi government hastily appealed to
die American ambassador in Jiddah to intervene. He in turn suggested to the
Foreign Office that both sides should remain where they were and refrain from

acts of provocation. The Foreign Office agreed, and told the sultan of Muscat
to disband his tribal levies. It was the second fundamental error of judgement
made by the Foreign Office, and the sultan in particular (as we shall see), was to
pay a heavy price for it. The Saudi force remained in Buraimi for the better part
of two years, doing its best to suborn the local shaikhs and tribesmen into

denying their traditional allegiances and pledging fealty to the Al Saud.
By now the outlines of the Saudi government’s strategy were becoming
clear. Its principal target was the western areas of Abu Dhabi, especially the
Dhafrah, the Liwa and the adjacent districts, where oil was believed to lie.
Because Saudi Arabia had never exercised jurisdiction in these areas, the Saudi

government was directing its attention towards the Buraimi oasis, where it had
evidence of a past connexion, even if this amounted to nothing more than a
series of armed occupations in the preceding century. If it could buy or force its
way into possession of the oasis, or even part of it, and if it could put up some
kind of legal or historical case, however spurious, for claiming title to it, the
Saudi government might then hope that in the fullness of time the intervening

western areas would fall to it. Buraimi itself, in any case, would be a valuable
acquisition, for it was perfectly sited to act as a springboard for further
penetration of Oman, with the eventual aim of securing control of the Oman
steppes, where I PC survey parties had lately started operations.
The Anglo-Saudi negotiations culminated in an agreement in July 1954 to
submit the dispute to arbitration by an international tribunal. The tribunal was