Page 84 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

The Retreat from the Gulf 81

where peace and stability were maintained by Britain’s presence. While it was
unrealistic to think that Britain herself would remain in the Gulf indefinitely,

she had a continuing interest in the maintenance of peace in the area, particu­
larly in view of the operations of Western oil companies there and the security
of oil supplies for the industrial world. There was no single local power, in
Luce’s opinion, ‘reasonably well disposed towards a Western oil industry,
which could fill the vacuum effectively and continue to ensure the peace of the

area’. ‘If the present equilibrium were destroyed by our early withdrawal from
our commitments to the Gulf Rulers’, he continued, ‘the whole area could
rapidly become a jungle of smash-and-grab, and the scene of conflict would not
be confined to the Gulf States only . . .’
Time, therefore, was required for Britain to do what had to be done before
she withdrew. ‘The first requirement is an understanding between the two
principal powers concerned, Saudi Arabia and Iran, regarding the territorial

inviolability of the Gulf States, for without this there could be little hope of
avoiding Arab-Iranian conflict.’ The minor states of the Gulf should combine
in some kind of union which would accept the leadership of Saudi Arabia in
foreign affairs and defence, and co-operate with her in economic affairs. The
breach between Saudi Arabia and the sultanate of Oman should be repaired,
and the Gulf states made to abandon their feuds with one another. Thus, Luce

went on (and it should be recalled that he was writing in July 1967), the timing
of Britain’s withdrawal ‘should not be determined by any arbitrary or unilat­
eral decision designed to effect a small saving in British defence costs or to
satisfy opinion based on the artificial division of the world into east and west of
Suez’. On the contrary - and he laid great stress on the point - Britain should
strive ‘to terminate honourably our special treaty relationship with the Gulf

States and to withdraw without undue risk to the peace and stability of the
region’.

The events of the next two years caused Luce to modify his views slightly.
Writing in the Round Table of October 1969, he again described the Gulf as ‘an
unstable power vacuum’, and he still held to the belief that ‘there is no country
within the region which is strong enough to take over control and ensure peace

in the whole area’. Of the decision in January 1968 to leave the Gulf by the end
of 1971 he observed:

That so important a decision was taken without prior consultation with the rulers of
these states [Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial Shaikhdoms], or with our other friends in
the Gulf region, and apparently for reasons irrelevant to our and their interests in that
area, can only be regarded as morally wrong, unwise and unnecessary.

Nevertheless, now that the decision had been taken, it could not, in Luce’s

view, be reversed, or the withdrawal postponed. The creation of the Union of
Arab Emirates meant the end of the treaty system and of Britain’s special
position in the Gulf. Any show of hesitation on Britain’s part about leaving