Page 87 - Arabia the Gulf and the West

84 Arabia, the Gulf and the West

Luce and the Foreign Office now had little more than twelve months i
which to make the Union of Arab Emirates a reality, and to persuade the major
Gulf states to accept it. The major obstacle to Saudi Arabia’s acceptance was
obviously, the frontier dispute with Abu Dhabi. Following Zayid’s sub­

mission, in the absence of British support, to Faisal’s ultimatum over drilling
the two rulers had agreed to open discussions on the frontier at the beginning of
September. Before these could start Luce visited Faisal at Taiz, the king’s
summer residence in the hills above Mecca. As a result of their talks the

Foreign Office urged Zayid not to negotiate directly with the Saudis but to
allow the British government to use its ‘good offices’ to see if an accommoda­
tion could be reached. It was easy to see why the Foreign Office recommended
this course. If direct negotiations over which the Foreign Office had no control
took place between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, they might well create
difficulties which would delay the British departure from the Gulf. It was much

less easy to see what benefit Zayid would derive from accepting the Foreign
Office’s advice. Accommodation implied concessions by both sides, and the
Foreign Office made it clear that it considered that Faisal had already made his
concession by not claiming as much of Abu Dhabi shaikhdom as he had in 1949
and 1967. The question that the Foreign Office now left hanging in the air was

- what concession was Zayid prepared to make in return?
Despite his reservations, Zayid agreed to let the Foreign Office act for him.
(If he had refused, then the Foreign Office was prepared, ironical as it may
seem, to insist upon its right to do so under the existing treaties with Abu
Dhabi.) In the next few months a number of suggestions were floated for the

resolution of the dispute, most of them of obscure provenance but all of them
earnestly taken up and pressed upon Zayid by the Foreign Office. Faisal, it was
hinted, might be prepared to give up his claims to the Buraimi oasis by means
of some kind of face-saving device akin to that which had permitted the shah to

withdraw his claim to Bahrain. He would do so, however, only on condition
that he received full satisfaction of his claims to the western and southern parts
of Abu Dhabi shaikhdom. Again it was suggested that the territory south of the
23rd parallel might be transferred to Saudi Arabia, with ADPC retaining its
concessionary rights in the area but paying revenue for the oil it extracted from
the Zarrara field to Saudi Arabia instead of Abu Dhabi. Alternatively, the

territory between the 23rd parallel and the Riyad Line might be designated a
neutral zone, with ARAMCO and ADPC jointly exploiting the Zarrara-
Shaiba structure, sharing the revenues proportionately between Saudi Arabia
and Abu Dhabi. A refinement of this proposal - put forward because t e

Saudis were ill-disposed to the concept of neutral zones after their experience
with the neutral zone they had shared with Kuwait - envisaged the
question being placed entirely under Saudi Arabia’s control, with A
alone exploiting the Zarrara-Shaiba field and Faisal making an ex gratia pay
ment from the revenues to Abu Dhabi. On more than one occasion, so it was