Page 143 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

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port V-Chap. XXVIII. 121
hundred tons, but I do not think that this can ho dono, with advantage, or ovon that it can
bo done at all, from the wnnt of moans of containing so largo a quantity.
10. I am awaro of tho great oomfort and consolation that the sepoys at Ras-ul-khima
would derivo from the prescnco of their families, nn indulgence whioh I am convinced the
Government foel disposed to graut, but under tho ooncoivod possible want of water, I am
induced, however unwilling, to recommend that the families may not yet bo permitted to
proceed, unless Government should bo pleased to send a further supply of water for tboir
ovontuul use.
17. The Government will percoivo that llieso rcoomroendationa and remarks aro offored
under tho idea that ltus-ul-khima will not immediately be given up, but it is right for me ;
to state that I do not percoivo any ndvantagos sufficiently strong to induce mo to wish that it
should bo retained longer than tho period which Government may determine as fitting for
tho removal of our troops to somo other plnco in the Gulf. I have already most strongly
recommended that the eventual removal should he to the Island of Kishjn, all that I have
learnt since offering that recommendation, has tended to confirm mg opinion of that island
being the most favourable situation in every respect, and if no other considerations existed than
those of political expediency, I should be disposed to urge that the removal should take place
immediately.
18. Not the smallest doubt need bo entertained respecting tho result of my attack that
tho Arabs can make on Ras-ul-khima, yet tho possibility of such an occurronce ought not
altogether to be lost sight of. Tho ohief cousideration that would induce me to deprecate such
an event is the necc66iiy that would consequently be imposed upon us of retaining that place
until the impression that would bo made by any attack should bo woru off, that wo might
avoid the imputation of being drivon out which the Arabs would uaturally conceive had
boou tho ca6o, did wo retire before due time had elapsed.
19. Captain Thompson's report mentions particularly tho growing ascendancy of Sultan-
bin-Sagger j the result of this will probably be the establishment of that Chieftain's power
ovor a considerable portion of the Arabian Coast. Thore is ono direct inference to bo drawn
from this ascendancy which is that the Chieftains on the portion of the const alluded to
hove lost much of their religious feature, for Sultan has abjured Wahabism although
many who willingly acknowledge his superiority still profess that faith, which appears to
be generally on the decline, and is now hardly acknowledged on the Persian side oj the Gulf.
On the Arabian Coast Hu6sen-bin-Ali of Zyak, is, 1 believe, the only Chieftain who still
professes Wahabism; although old he preserves his enthusiasm, and may oertainly be
considered a man of penetration and oven of 6ome taluub which occasioned him to bo appoiuted
by the Imam of the Wahabis to receive from the Joasmi tribe the tribute payable to the
general treasury by the followers of Wabab. Until lately it appeared probable that Hussen-
bin-Ali would have been able to maintain himself aB a powerful rival to Sultan-bin-Sagger,
but that expectation must now, I conceive, be abandoned, as none of the Chieftains seem to
coalesce with Hussen-bin-Ali with the exception of Cuzuk-bin-Ahmed, a person of little
political consideration. We may, therefore, I think caloulate upou the ascendancy of Sultao-
bin-Sngger, and it is with bim that we shall in all probability have to uegociate the trausfer
of Has-ul-khima, for its former Chieftain Hus6en-bin-Raukaia appears to have rendered
biro6elf entirely subservient to Sultan.
20. The expression made throughout the Gulf by the complete success of the expedi­
tion is palpably very great, and must, whilst it is maintained, produce the most beneficial
consequences; such decidedly favourable opportunities for manifesting our superiority are
not likoly to occur again j wo should therefore bo careful not to ruu the risk of weakening
the ascendancy wo have acquired ; this oonsideratioo points particularly to the advisableness
of abstaining generally from any active interference with the transactions on the Arabian
Contiuent.
21. It has hitherto been usual for both cruisers and merchant ships proceeding up
or down the Gulf to sail along the Persian Coast only; this practice may now be abandoned
whenever it may be convenient to do so. But to enable our vessels to approach the Arabian
Coast with safety, a circumstance absolutely necessary to secure the permanent suppression
of piracy, a minute and accurate survey of that coast should be immediately undertaken,
Our knowledge of many parts of tho Gulf is extremely imporfeot, and even the number of
the islands adjacent to the Arabian Coast is unknown.
22. It is extremely advisable at this particular orisis whilst the minds of many in the
Gulf still remain unsettled, that as many of our cruisers as can be spared, should be seen
frequently both on the Arabian and Persian shores, we should approach them in as friendly
and conciliatory a manner as possible, prepared of course at all times to put down the very
first manifestations of any return to piratical pursuits, but as treaties now exist with all the
independent tribes on the coast, and there is a British settlement at au inconsiderable distance
from every part of the Gulf, it is particularly desirable that all vessels oaptured in the actual
commission, under an allegation, or detained from suspicion of piracy, should, unless ils.
cases of extreme necessity, be eent into a British port ^o be condemned, previous to being
destroyed.