Page 154 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

132 Part V—Chap. XXIX.

dated 3rd December 1820, Captain Thompson supported his action in marching
with British Indian troops into tho interior on the ground that tho haunts of
tho pirates wcro in tho interior, not on the coast side.
2GG. The Bombay Government addressed (letter No. 40, dated 9th March
1820) Colonel Thompson sovorcly condemning his proceedings:—
(2) Your conduct in marching into tho interior against tho residenoo of the tribe of Beni-
bu-Ali has boon considered highly hlamcublo. It was at varianco with tho letter of tho
instructions to Major-Goneral Sir William Grant Kcir, and it not only endangered tho safety
of tho troops, but was calculated to injure tho interests of the British Government even in tho
event of complclo 6ucacsp, by tho false impression which it must havo given of its policy.
(3) What policy has repeatedly and expressly been declared to bo, to confine our views
strictly to the control and suppression of piracy when it actually subsists, and to abstain from
taking part in disputes of the States in the Gulf, even when within the reach of our maritime
power, further than toas absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of that object.
(4) Your co-operation with tho Imam, on tho other hand, was calculated to porsuade the
Arab powers that we were inclined to pursue our enemies into the interior, and to interfere in
their internal disputes for the professed purpose of guarding against prospective dangers at sea.
Tho natural couscquencos of such on opinion would be to goocrate distrust and suspicion of our
ultimate objects, and to draw iuto confederacies against us, even the tribee and powers who are
least entrusted in protecting pirates.
(6) Tho arguments you havo brought forward on a supposed system of piracy, to be
carried only in land towns, do not appear to justify your conclusions; if it be not sufficient
for us to destroy all vessels, and seaports belonging to pirates, the Hon'ble the Govemor-in-
Counoii sees no poiut at which we are to stop, short of pursuing such tribes as far as they may
chooso to retreat into the interior, and attacking all the inland possessions of those, a portion
of whom may have engaged in maritime depredations.
(6) The course of your negotiation with tho Beni-bu-Ali was equally inconsistent with
the polioy of confining our objects to the suppression of piracy. The measure of sending to
Maskat for au Agent to be employed ns a messenger of tho British Government in the first
instance, 6eeins to have been likely to confound our designs with those of the Arabs of the
continent; he was evidently an unfit person to ascertain the real views of a tribe in rebellion
agaiust that Prince, as ho was neither likely to bo well received nor to report fairly.
(7) From the commencement of the negotiation at Belad Beni Hussain, tho object of sup­
pressing piracy seems to have been entirely lost sight of, the point ou which you advised the
Imam to break off all treaty, had no reference to it, nor does a compliance with that demand
even if it could reasonably have been expected, appears at all requisite to the accomplishment
either of our plans, or of those of the Imam; but considering the reluctance of the Arabs to
part with their arms as well as the possibility of their apprehending certain to defeat all nego­
tiation by bringing on suspicion that no sincere wish for accommodation was entertained. °
(8) Your assurance to the Imam that the resources of the British Government would be
everywhere at his disposal was a still greater departure from the principle of our policy iu the
Gulf of Persia, aud must have led the Imam to suppose that our late misfortune had turned
our occasional co-operation against the pirates, into a general defensive alliance or a guarantee
of his dominions.
267. In order to retrieve the British honour a second expedition was
despatched under the command of General Smith.
The objects of the expedition were—-
1st—to obtain the surrender and public execution of the murderers of
the British messenger;
2nd— to put tho Imam in possession of the territory occupied by the
Beni-bu-Ali;
3rd—to obtain the release of all prisoners and restoration of all arms
captured in the late action; and
4th—to obtain effectual security against the renewal of piracy by the
Beni-bu-Ali, in case they should possess any part independent
of the Imam and to procure the release of all Indian prisoners
taken in former piratical expeditions.
268. The expedition met with a complete success. The details of the movo-
inent of the troops and their proceedings belong to the history of Maskat and
are treated in the history of Maskat in the Bombay Selections No. XXIV.