Page 159 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

Part V—Chap. XXXI. 137
cm dccido on thorn and whoso answer may ho soon oxpootcd. You should also point out the
powor tho British Government possesses of avenging on Persia any unprovoked attack which
may bo made on our troops in tho Gulf.
7. Should it appear impossible to avoid hostilities by other means, a contingency which
tho Governor in Council considers highly improbablo, you aro empowered to propose to the
Prince that tho detnohment should bo withdrawn from Kishmh to Maskat, or, adverting to its
unhealthincss, to any plneo within the Imam's territories in which His Highness may concur,
ponding tho negotiation regarding tho ultimato fate of it. You will explain that this conces­
sion originates in tho roluctanco of this Government to disturb the friendship subsisting
botwoon the British and Porsian nations, especially on a point which has not been decided by
tho Governor-General in Council; that tho removal of tho troops is not to bo interpreted into
a recognition of tho King of Persia, titlo to Kishrad, nor to act as a restraint on our reocoupy-
ing the position, if tho decision of the Suprorae Government, or auy other cause should render
such a mensuro expedient.
8. Tho accompanying instructions to tho Commanding Officer of the station will enable
you to carry this moasuro into effect. . But it is left to your discretion to deliver or withhold
the letter according to circumstances. You will of course bo careful to conceal from tho
Persians tho knowlcdgo of tho powers you possess. Your caution throughout must be to com­
mit tho Government as little as possible, until instructions be received from Bengal.
9. The necessity of observing tho strictest secrooy on this point is obvious since should
any rumour of it reuch Persia it will doubtless produce the very crisis it is tho wish of Govern­
ment to avoid.
10. These instructions are given that tho British officers in the Porsian Gulf may be pre­
pared for all exigencies, but tho Honourable the Governor in Council is of opinion that the
assembly of troops reported by Captain Dcsehamps has been occasioned by alarm at the report
of tho expedition under Major-General Smith. In that oveut your duty will be confiued to
removing the Prince’s apprehensions.
11. You are further vested with a discrotionary power to proceed to Tehran, should that
ceuvso bo expedient and especially if it should appear that no hostile act he likely to bo com­
mitted by the Government of Shiraz, in which case your communications might bo confined, as
already observed, to suoh assurances as may dispel the fears of His Highness.
12. It is at that court alone that any final adjustment of the present discussions can take
place, and it is obvious that the chief obstacles to tho removal of the King of Persia's fears
have been the exaggerations of the Government of Shiraz, through whom the British Govern­
ment would now bo obliged to correspond, were you to limit your personal comrauuicatious to
His Highness and his officers.
13. You will however correspond with Mr. Willock and be entirely guided by that officer's
suggestions and by his directions in bringing forward or withholding any subject which
Mr. Willock may think likely to affect the general interests of the Mission.
14. I enclose letters from the Governor to the King of Persia and the Sudder Auzim, as
well as to tho Prince at Shiraz, the last being so worded as to admit of your entering or not on
the details of negotiation with the latter, as you judge proper; but any communication that
oompels you to eater into negotiations at Shiraz might” detain you at that place to the
great detriment of the affairs entrusted to you.
15. In the accorapauimenfc No. J, you will perceive there are various charges preferred
by the Persian Government against Captain Bruce, the Resident at Bushire, au explanation of
which is necessary to enable you to remove them either by a personal communication with the
Persian Government, or through His Majesty's Chargd d'Affaires, as may appear to him to be
most advisable.
10. The objeot of the British Government in its operations in the Gulf haviug in view
the preserving of its tranquillity, as it was owing to the wars uraong the Powers who inhabit
its shores thnt the growth of piraoy was encouraged, it applied its whole attention to bring
about a reconciliation between the Imam of Maskat and the Utubis of Bahrein—at the sam#
time that it offered its modiation to prevent hostilities against Bahrein on the part of the King
of Persia, and even to prooure the latter a tribute rather than allow of war.
17. These proceedings were so far from inconsistent with each other that they sprung
naturally from the 6amo source, a desire to preserve the peaoe of the Gulf. At all events
the mediation between the Imam and the Utubis was the avowed act of the Government of
Bombay, and is in no respect imputable to Captain Bruoe.
18. The capture of the Linga boats was the act of the officers of His Majesty's Navy,
over whom Captain Bruce had not the least control. Tho destruction of them was however
the conseqaence of their own impradont intercourse with the Joassmees.
273. Dr. Jukes proceeded to Maskat and then to Kishm, where he learnt
that Mirza Mahomed Bauker had left for Bombay, having been deputed by
the Shiraz Government on a mission to the Bombay Government on the
subject on question. Dr. Jukos decided to proceed at once to 8hiraz. He
reported to the Bombay Govomment that cholera was raging in Arabia, in.
Kishm and in Persia (letter dated 20 th July 1821). On arrival at Shiraz he