Page 199 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat
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Part Vl-Cbap. XLI.              177
           the Royal Navy in the cove of Muscat, tho British Government purchased hor of the
           captors and gave her up with hor wholo crow and equipments to tho Imam for the purpose
           of being restored to tho French.
              8.  Tho late Imam docs not appear on any one occasion to havo shown a disposition
           to consider himself as tuigagcd in a general alliance with the British Government; and although
           tho conduct of tho present Imam lias always boon much more strongly marked with the
           spirit of such a connection, yot the frequent explanations that have taken place with him
           on this subject have been sucl^as to prevent the possibility of any such impression remaining on
           his mind. In illustration of this fact I have the honor to enclose copies in English and
           Arabic of a letter from Mr. Duncan to tho Imam, dated September 13th, 1810, and of one from
           Mr. Brown, dated November 20th, 1811, and I am directed further to refer you to the
           instructions to Captain Thompson on tho o:*.asion of his attack on Ueniboo Ali of which a
           copy is enclosed, and to those to Lieutenant Maclcod ou his appointment to the Residency in
           tho Gulph for proofs that the sain* understanding of the neutrality of the two States in each
           other’s wars has been avowed and acted on up to the present time, and that whenever we have
           co-oporated with tho I main against the other Powers in the Gulph it lia* been sohly with the
           view of suppressing piracy.
              9.  For the more complete illustration of the nature of tho relations between tbe State of
           Muscat and tbe British Government, I »m directed to transmit a summary of the transactions
           that have taken place between the two States siucc the first discussion of the engagements
           now in force.
              10.  The preceding observations will enable you to meet any arguments whiob Hia High­
           ness may seem inclined to bring forward when you shall visit him on your return to the Persian
           Gulph in favor of his claim to an assistance on all occasions and it will further be only  nc cos-
           tary to advise him regarding the line of policy which ho ought himself to adopt in future.
              11.  On this subject His Highness might be informed that the British Government had
           no wish to tetter him in any plans or confederacies which he might think for his  own
           advantage. All it would do would he to point out to him that the common interest of both
           Governments required that the tranquillity of the Gulph should he maintained and at all events
           that piracy should be suppressed tor xohich purpose it would be wisest in both to avoid disturb­
           ing the present peace themselves as well as to he ready to act together against any Slate that
           should renew the system of general depredation.
              12.  1 he plan proposed by His Highness of insisting on the maintenance of maritime
           peace as reported in your letter of the llth December dues not appear to be practicable even if
           11 were entirely desirable. We havo not the mean* to compel the tribes on tbe Persian side to
           accede to it, and even ȣ all did so, the system would bo very unequal in its operation, as
           tending to increase the power of those Chiefs who aro superior by land while it annihilated
           those whose principal means of annoyance are at sea : Sheikh Tunoon. for instance, would be
           left without tho least diminution of his military resources, while Sultan bin Suggur would be
           deprived uf his only means of acting against his enemies.
              13.  Tbe duration of 6uch a system also would be uncertain even if its effects were purely
           beneficial. A change of circumstances might render those most anxious for maritime war
           who arc now most averse to it; and in the event of the death of His Highness that lmaum
           his successor might be the first to have recourse to that naval power in which the state of
           Muscat so far surpasses all its neighbours.
              314. In 1830, when Syud Said had left Maskat for Zanzibar, a large
                                         number of the tribes in Oman rose in
                 Volume 432 of 1830. p. 101.
                                         rebellion against his power, led by a
           sister of 8yud Hillal, who had been imprisoned in a fort by the Imam, and
           Hamud bin Azan bin Gheis. The former seized the Fort of Soweik and tbe
           latter Sohar. The flame of rebellion spread so far and fast, that the whole of
           the most productive and populous ooast of Batinah was overrun by tbe
           insurgents and even Maskat was threatened. Sultan bin Saggar took advantage
           of this confusion to make a demonstration against Maskat. The Regent
          applied to the Bombay Government for assistance in this oritioal state of affairs
           in Oman, whereupon they addressed the following important instructions to the
           Resident with a view to save the power of the Imam from annihilation (letter
           No. 467, dated 12th April 1830) :—
              In transmitting to you the documents noted in tho margin, I am directed by the Hon'blo
          tho Governor in Council to signify to you that he considers the British G ovemment to be
          so far bound to, and connected with, its ally the Imam of Maskat as to prevent his ruin and
          downfall by every means in its power. Without therefore considering it necessary that you
          should interfere on account of any partial disorders in His Highness's territories, the Governor
          in Council has no hesitation in authorising and directing you to inform Sultan bin Suggar,
          Hamud bin Azan and any other Chieftains, that the British Government will not permit any
          net which you may deer, calculated to annihilate or seriously and permanently to weaken the
          Imam’s power.
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