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Part VI—Chap. XLI.            179

          was not called for, and moreover advised, since his absence from Maslcat had
          been attended with so many disadvantages, to consider tho integrity and pro­
          tection of his hereditary dominions paramount to every othor object.
              318.  Tho demonstration mado in the Imam’s favour by tho visit of tho
          British vessels of war to tho Coast of Batinah, and their appearance at Maskat,
          was undoubtedly attended with highly bcnoficial consequences to tho interests
          of His Highness. Tho liberation by Saud bin Ali of his prisoners, for so
          trifling a cousidoration as 8,000 dollars, was to bo attributed solely to tho
          apprehensions oxcited by his knowlodgo that an application had boon made
          for British intorforonco. Tho support thus afforded by tho British Govern­
          ment interrupted various intrigues carried on against tho authority of tho
          Imam, and inspired a degreo of confidence in tho minds of His Highness’s
          adherents which could not have been derived from any other source.

              A roviow of the occurrences of tho preceding few years, in connection
          with this repetition of embarrassment, led to the formation of a very unfavour­
          able estimate of the situation of our ally, the Imam, at this time. It could
          not, indeed, be concealed, that our influence alone prevented his immediate
          downfall; and if the policy of tho Wahabis had been less peaceable than all
          accounts concurred in representing it, from their attention being doubtless
          drawn to their own embarrassments, we should probably have been forced
          into aotual hostilities, for tho defence even of his capital itself.
              319.  The menacing power of tho Wahabis, and tho march of their army
          into the province of Oman, at the invitation of most of the tribes, began now
          to excite tlie fears of the Imam for the integrity of his dominions, and he
          deemed it his best policy to form a closer connection with them, under tho
          cognisance of the British authorities, who were at the same time fully alive
          to the critical nature of his situation, and aware, that unless a rupture with
          this fanatical and restless sect could be averted by the conciliatory policy of
          the Imam, British assistance, or a renewed success of tho Egyptian arms to
          the north, could alone enable him effectually to resist their encroachments.
          It was even to bo feared that little confidence could be aocorded to their for­
          bearance, if circumstances placed the town and shipping of Maskat within their
          reach. It was agreed that the Imam should pay 5,000 German crowns per
          annum as Zukat to the Wahabi Chief ; that each was to hold possession of
          his own coast according to tho limits then existing, the former’s extending to
          JaalaD, the latter’s thence to Katif; and further, an engagement was entered
          into, binding tho parties reciprocally to assist in putting down any rebellions
          which might arise in their respective territories. The fulfilment of this last
          article the Imam assured the .Resident when laying the matter before him
          by letter and through his Agent Haji Hossein Gulam, would depend upon
          the wishes of tho British Government. The line of policy thus marked out
          and pursued by the Imam coincided exactly with the views of the British
          Government, who considered it advisable that Sis Highness's relations with
          the Wahabis should remain friendly; but with reference to his being
          required to act in concert with them, under the terms of the engagement, that
          he should avoid being led into hostilities on this account. He was accordingly
          strongly urged against any participation in foreign war, and cautioned againt
          committing himself on points of magnitude, particularly 07i that of the
          supremacy of Mahomed Ali, JPasha of Egypt.
             320.  The Imam was, however, still apprehensive of the invasion of Oman
                                        by the Wahabis sooner or later or
           Volumo SI-610 of 1833-1834, pp. 114-123.
                                        being dragged into war for putting
          down tribes under Wahabis’ control. He therefore pressed the Bombay
          Government for avowal of their policy in such a contingency. They were in
          favour of protecting the Imam’s power being annihilated by the Wahabis,
          and asked for the instructions of the Government of India and also orders on
          the policy which they laid down in their letter to the Resident, dated 30th
          June 1826. The following reply of the Government of India, dated 1st February
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