Page 34 - Gulf Precis(II)_Neat

12 Part I—Chap. IV.
between him and the French, and becauso I was satisfied a sense of his own interest a
indeed preservation would, after I had stated to him the intentions of the British Q an(*
ment, soouro his acting in every particular as was wished, and that aftor such oond^t*!
certainly must expect that the Iinaum would issue orders to his officers to give mu.? *
of any of hie positions in the Gulph that the English might require for the purpose'0 f
opposiug the French, and should ho do so ho might dopond upon their being restored th
moment that the emergency was past, which would uot bo the case if a narrow or suspioi *
policy led him to act otherwise, and wo woro obliged by imperious circumstances to mako ouU-
eelvod masters of them iu a forcible manner. r"
5. I concluded this communication which was understood to bo ono of quite a privat
nature, by expressing my confidquoo in the Imaum’s conduct, who would, 1 added, if anv
contest took place, if he acted with that decision and spirit that his interests declared, find
the British Government fully disposed to reward his exertions by increased favour and
protection.
0. Mahomed Gholoom said I was well acquainted with the sentiments of the late
Iinaum, and that he could ossure his son hnd, on every ocoasion, evinoed the same attachment
to the English nation, aud that the Frenoh had only been conciliated with a view to
preserve the trade in Muscat from tho depredations of their privateers. He could answer,
he added, on the part of bis master, that not afoot of Land should be given them that belonged
to the Muscat State, the Prince of which, he observed, had, of course, no power to alienate
Gombroon or any other place in the Gulph which belonged to the King of Persia.
7. These places might, I stated in reply, belong to the King of Persia, as Lord
Paramount of the soil; but if they were garrisoned by the troops of the Iraaura, that Chief
should be made responsible to the English Government for their cession to its enemies. This
Mahomed Gholoom allowed would be just, and 6aid that they never would be yielded.
8. At the close of our conference when I mentioned that I meant to sail immediately,
Sterol Vcshendass, the Company's broker, who was present, expressed a wish (in which Mahomed
Dept, Gooloom conoarred) that I should stay to hoar tho Imaum's sentiment on what I had stated.
of 18 I told him he had altogether mistaken my purpose if he thought I meant to enter into any
6124. negotiations with the Imaum ; that l had merely as a sincere well-wisher of that Prince
informed him of the intentions of the Government 1 represented, and of what it would expect
from him on the occurrence of a crisis, that */ had stated that nothing could alter the
intentions I had announced, and that the Imaum would, after the full and open communication
I had made, be completely aware of the consequences of the different lines of policy that might be
recommended to his adoption, and if he incurred the displeasure of the British Government, he
oould not reproach me with having left him ignorant of the means by which he could have
avoided a misfortune, that could not fail of bringing instant ruin on himself and subjects.
9. Mahomed Gholoom said he would communicate all I bad said to the Imaum who
would be, he was confident, grateful for the undisguised manner in whioh I bad stated my
sentiments and I might, he said, assure myself that his master would under all events prove
faithfal to his alliance with the British Government. He then took his leave and I proceeded
on my voyage.
10. This communication to the Imaum will I trust be judged in perfect conformity with
the sentiments in the letter from Your Lordship in Council, to the Government of Bombay,
under date the 22nd February which with a number of other papers relative to Muscat, was
furnished by that Government for my guidance and instruction.
11. To have obtained a formal grant from the Imaum for the cession of Gombroon or
any other port would have occupied more time in negotiation than I oould well 6pare at the
present stage of my mission. It might have also given rise to some embarrassing discussion
respecting the rights of Persia both as they regarded the Port of Gombroon and the Island
in the Gulph, and after all would not, as far as I can judge, have been so likely to effect the
objeot as the mode I have adopted.
12. The substance as well as the manner of the communication I made, appear to me
suitable to the relations of the two Governments, and as the Imaum must be sensible of his
inferior and dependant state, it seems politic at this moment to impress him with the most
serious apprehensions of the displeasure of the Government, because his policy like that of all
other weak Princes is chiefly regulated by his fears. The French without tho power of
seriously injuring him by the.mere terror of a few privateers which threaten his trade
cannot maintain at present as great an influence in his Councils as the English, who have
not only the command of the seas but possess every port with whioh Muscat trades m India,
and of course the means of completely ruining that Stato whenever it chooses. The Imaum
and the Ministers cannot be ignorant of this faot and it is to be expected when their
fears are equally excited from both quarters they will without hesitation inoline to that wbicn
can do them most injury, and from whioh by exerting themeelves in its cause, they ®*P®® a
favour and support that will give more prosperity and permanence to their Government &n
it has ever yet possessed.
Secret and PoiL 29. General Maloolm arrived in Bushire roads on the night of the 10th
May 1808* Mr- Smith»th® Resident, came off to see him on the monnng J?®
1862. ’ ‘ Hth and was followed by the Sheikh (or Governor) accompanied y
principal inhabitants of the town.