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“It cannot reasonably be supposed that Great Britain would abandon a posit’
attained by so many years of constant effort, or would acquiesce in attempts on the i
of other powers to acquire political predominance in the south of Persia. AUb
therefore, Mis Majesty’s Government have no desire to obstruct in any way the effort- f
Russia to find a commercial entrance for her trade in the Persian Gulf, or to oppose a °
obstacle to the passage of her commerce from the north for export from Persian ports thev
could not admit that such commercial facilities should form the pretext for the occupation
by Russia of points possessing strategical importance or for the establishment of such an
ascendancy in the south as she already enjoys in the north.
“The Persian Government should therefore distinctly understand and bear in mind
that Great Britian could not consent to the acquisition by Russia of a military or naval
station in the Persian Gulf, for the reason that such a station must be regarded as a
challenge to Great Britain and a menace to her Indian Empire. b
“ If the Persian Government were at any time to make such a concession to Russia,
it would be necessary for His Majesty’s Government to take in the Persian Gulf such
measures as they might consider necessary for the protection of British interest: measures
which in view of their naval strength in those waters would be attended with no serious
difficulty.
“Nor, again, could His Majesty’s Government acquiesce in the concession to Russia
of any preferential political rights or advantages, or any commercial monopoly or exclusive
privilege in the southern or south-eastern districts of Persia, including Seistan. British
interests must inevitably suffer by such concessions, and the Persian Government have
themselves recognized and acquiesced in this view on more than one occasion. They
gave in October 1897 a written promise to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the
customs of Southern Persia should never be placed under foreign control and supervision.
When in 1900 the customs revenues were pledged as security for the loan obtained from
the Russian Banque des Pr6ts, a special exception was made of the revenues and ports
of Southern Persia, and when Her Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires in April 1900 called the
attention of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the interest which the British
Government had in the ports of Mohammerah, Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and othei ports
of the Persian Gulf, and insisted on the right of Her Majesty’s Government to be consist­
ed before any change was made in the administration of the customs at Mohammerah or
in the position of the Sheikh, His Excellency replied that ‘not only in Mohammerah, but
in every part of Persia where British interests were concerned, the Persian Government,
before taking any steps of importance, would consult the British Government.’ His
Majesty’s Government have taken note of this assurance with satisfaction, and have only
to add that a hypothecation, of the integral revenues of any of the southern or south­
eastern provinces of Persia as security for a foreign loan would be even more detrimental
to Persian interests, and not less objectionable from a British point of view than that of
the customs of the southern ports.”
1 155. The Shah?s autograph reply, which was subsequently embodied as
Secret E., July 190a, N01. 844-306. Enclosure t an official document, contained a general
Proceedings No. 879. assurance that his Government would never
come to an understanding with any foreign power against Great Britain, did not
intend alienating any portion of Persian territory to a foreign power for a military
station, and would not pledge any of its internal revenues.
U 155-A. Copy of the above despatch was sent to the Government of India
with the Secretary of State’s despatch
Secret E., May 1902, No- 7.
, No. 8-Secret, dated 14th March 1902,
with reference to their despatch No. 183, dated 7th November 1901, as
I
indicating the position taken up by His Majesty’s Government. The Secretary of
State at the same time observed
“Without entering into controversy or expressing my concurrence in all of the pro­
positions enunciated in these papers, I have to assnre, Your Government that it is the
earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to maintain alike the integrity of Persia, an
the interests, political and commercial, which this country has claimed and supported y
its continuous course of action in the past/'
156. On 17th January 1902, in the House of Commons, Viscount Cranborne,
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said:—
* * * * * ♦
“ there was no change in the attitude maintained by the British Governmen
affairs of the Persian Gulf. Our position in the Persian Gulf, both commercia y
politically, was one of a very special character,’and His Majesty s Gcavrernm ^
always considered that the ascendancy of Great Britain in the Persian e.at<.mCOt
foundation of British policy. This was not merely a question of theory, it was a
of fact. Uur trade interests there far exceeded those of any other country.
(Extract from the Times of January i8th, 1902.)