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g. I trust that the foregoing observations, read by the light of the plan, will make the
actual position clear, and will enable the Government of India and His Majesty’s Legation
to come to a definite decision as to what line it is expedient for us to adopt both with
regard to the limits of our telegraph station and other points dealt with in the foregoing.
239. The establishment of the Persian Customs at Henjam created great ex­
citement among the Arabs. It was clear to them that the customs was established
for no revenue purposes, but for a political purpose, that is, in order to assert the
Persian sovereignty over the island. The Arabs, who belong to the same tribe
as those of Debai, were in no mood to tolerate this exercise of sovereignty, and
were very much inclined to attack the Customs Mirza. The latter, however,
established himself close to the telegraph station and depended for his water
on o ir tanks. The Arabs who looked up to the British for protection, like their
brethren at Debai, did not evidently look favourably upon the protection afforded
to the customs Mirza thereby. The Arab Sheikh spoke to Lieutenant Shakespear
in February 1905 of his determination never to acknowledge Persian sovereignty,
but was told by the Assistant Resident not to create any trouble or disturbance
until he wrote to him or came personally to see him after receiving an answer to
the reference of his case to the Resident. Some definite statement of our policy
or attitude had soon to be made to the Arab Sheikh, to tell him that he is a
subject of Persia and that we have nothing to do with him and at the same time
to let the Persian Mirza reside within the shelter of the telegraph station was
calculated to impair our relations with the Arabs and also to endanger the safety
of our telegraph station. There was no reason moreover why we should assume
any responsibility for the subsistence or safety of an official, who, except as a
spy upon ourselves, had no raison d'etre on the island. In these circumstances
the Viceroy asked Sir A. Hardinge whether it would not be advisable to
inform the Persian Government that they must either remove the Mirza without
delay from the neighbourhood of the station (which would be tantamount to
withdrawal from the island) or permit us to post Indian guard for the protection
of our men.
240. The proposal for sending a guard to Henjam had been made by Sir A.
Hardinge when on 24th December 1904
Secret E., March 1905, Nos. 803 81a.
he notified the establishment of customs
post there. He, however, subsequently asked that the despatch of the guard
might be postponed, as it would probably suggest the idea that the telegraph
station was a cloak to military occupation and be detrimental to the settlement
of the question of the Henjam-Bandar Abbas extension.
241. In the circumstances reported in April 1905, the Government preferred
to insist on the Customs Mirza being remov­
Secret E., September 1905, Nos. 68-104. (No.75).
ed, as that would mean return to status quo,
recovering our prestige with the Arabs and dispensing with the cost of a guard
(Telegram from the Viceroy to Sir A. Hardinge, dated 6th May 1905).
242. Sir A. Hardinge replied on 7th
Ibid, No. 77.
May 1905
"If we ask for removal of the Mirza or establishment of an Indian guard to protect
our station, the Persian Government will undoubtedly reply with an offer to send Persian
troops for the security of both. This will not improve matters. Perhaps the Customs
Mirza would leave the island without waiting for instructions from M. Naus, if the Arabs
were to threaten to kill him. '1 his has happened on the Trans-Caspian Frontier. Do we
think we need go out of our way to protect the Mirza? We can always send an Indian
guard for ourselves once the Telegraph agreement is signed."
243. The following measures were then
Secret E., September 1905, Nos. 681*04.
taken to protect our position at Henjam :—
I. —British men-of-\var were ordered whenever passing up and down
the Gulf to call at Henjam
Ibid, No. 80.
[and occasionally at Lingah
and Bandar Abbas]—see telegram from Naval Commander-in-
Chief to the Government of India, Marine Department, dated 13th
May 1905.
II. —Major Cox was told to inform the Customs Mirza, as suggested by
him, that the water-supply at
Ibid. No. 85.
Henjam was low and that he
could not be permitted to draw from our tanks any longer (Tele-
gram dated 19th May 1505).

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