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the port had yet to be found which would suit the purposes of that Power, and
reference was made to the lack of local supplies of coal or other fuel as likely to
minimise the value of any foreign naval station in these waters. Assuming an
attempt by Russia to acquire a maritime post towards the upper end of the Gulf,
it was feared that her attention might not improbably be called to Khor Musa.
She might find here that outlet to the sea for a railway descending from the high
lands in the interior of Persia which is understood to be one of the objects of her
ambition, and a harbour so constructed would certainly be well sheltered from
marine attack. No doubt these advantages would be largely neutralised by a
British occupation, as already recommended by the Government of India, of
the Hormuz-Kishm position at the entrance to the Gulf ; and one of their mam
reasons for so strongly insisting upon the importance of that position is the effect
that we should thereby be able to exercise upon the movements of a Power seek­
ing an interior rather than an exterior base in Persian waters.
302. It is also conceivable that in certain conditions Khor Musa might be
useful to ourselves. Should it be thought necessary at any time to occupy or
support Mohammerah, and should the ascent of the Shat-el-Arab for any reasons
be found inconvenient, a base for advance might be found here, the strategic
value of which would be enhanced by the proximity of the mountain country of
the Lur and Bakhtiari tribes, to which we have always looked to oppose a barrier
to Rusaian advance from the north or north-east. There is yet another contin­
gency in which Khor Musa might play a part in the political developments of the
future. Though it does not seem likely at present that these will include the
construction of a British railway in the
Secret E., July 1904, Nos. 430-432.
south-west corner of the Persian dominions,
it is worth while to know that a possible maritime outlet for such a project exists,
which may be worthy of more detailed consideration in circumstances that cannot
at present be foreseen. For all these reasons the Government of India com­
mended to the attention of His Majesty’s Government the features of a place
that seems to us to possess strategic and possibly commercial capabilities of no
mean order. (Despatch No. 71, dated 24th March 1904).
303. The Secretary of State expressed concurrence with the Government
of India in their estimate of the importance
Secret E., July 1904, Nos.420-433. (No. 431).
of Khor Musa and commended their report
to the consideration of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty (India Office to the
Foreign Office, dated 12th May 1904).
303-A. It was proposed to make a survey of the country round Khor Musa
and thence toKarun river and Shat-el-Arab
Secret E., May 1905, Nos. 135-136.
by the men with Mr. J. G. Lorimer while
on the Gazetteer Tour. But the Government of India thought that while Major
Morton was engaged in the irrigation survey, it would be in-apportune to ask for
permission for further surveys in Arabistan. (Telegram to Major Cox, dated
18th February 1905).
(iv) Report on the Charbar Bay.
303-B. A report on the above subject was submitted by Commanders Kemp
Secret E., June 1904, Nos. 300-388. (No. 314, and Somerville to the Naval Commander-
Enclosure No. 3). in-Chief in their letter, dated 1st July 1902,
which concludes with the opinion that the Charbar Bay is not naturally fitted
for the purpose of a large naval establishment, but that by means of extensive
engineering works, dredging, etc., bases and docks might possibly be constructed
on the site suggested in the report.

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