Page 454 - Gulf Precis(VIII)_Neat

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to secure the active assistance of Mis Highness the Sultan in checking the arms traffic in
the Persian Gulf, and should these efforts be successful, it may be possible to take similar
steps with regard to the traffic between Maskat and the African coast,”

Major Fagan’s views on the necessity of winning the Slutan of
Maskat over to our side in order to deal effectively with the
Arms traffic, 1899.

54. The Political Agent, Maskat, in submitting his views regarding the
traffic in arms at Maskat, and from thence to
Secret E., November 1899, Nos.
tilfi opposite coast, briefly reviewed the situa­
205—255.
tion. Referring to the seizure of the” Baluch­
istan, ” Major Fagan said that there was no doubt that the Sultan scarcely
realized, before this capture of the arms was effected, what the result of the agree­
ment to which he had become a party would be and this is amply verified both
by the remark that he made when he heard of the seizure which was duly reported
to you and by the efforts which he made to evade the obligations under which
he had placed himself to hold a court to adjudicate as to the legality of the
seizure. There is equally little doubt that his objection was, and still is, simply
'due to his knowledge of the fact that any interference with, or checking of the
arms traffic means loss of revenue to himself, more especially since the law of
prohibitions which has been put into force in Persia renders it necessary that
arms intended for Persian ports should be landed at Maskat (where they pay
duty) to be ultimately smuggled into Persia as opportunity offers.
Major Fagan further stated that from the very first His Highness had done
his utmost to nullify his agreement of January 1898 :—
(1) by encouraging, by every means in his power, the importation of
arms;
(2) by giving purchases of small quantities of arms, passes showing that
the arms purchased are for Sohar or some other ports in His
Highness’ dominions, notwithstanding that he is fully aware that
the arms are really intended for Persia ;
(3) by refusing to condemn arms seized by us even though the evidence
as to their evident destination is as complete as circumstances
permit.
" It is obvious, therefore,” wrote Major Fagan, ” that if this traffic is to be
put a stop to, it can only be done by winning over the Sultan to our side. Money
is what he is in need of and if he is to be persuaded at all it will only be done by
the agency of the rupees. If my ^ views are accepted, I would respectfully
suggest that in the first place His" Highness should be given a lump sum of
Rs. 26,250 for the permission accorded to the Government whereby they were
enabled to seize the arms on the “ Baluchistan,” and that, secondly, a percentage
should be promised him on the value of any arms seized in badans or native
craft in His Highness’waters and found by His Highness’ Court to be bound
for Persia.
I have suggested the payment of a percentage rather than a fixed monthly
sum because 1 think we would be more certain of His Highness’ active
assistance of the amount we give him depended on the successful results of his
co-operation. The seizure of a few native craft with arms on board for Persia, and
the confiscation of their cargo of arms, would, I feel convinced, be attended with
excellent results. It would be immaterial whether the arms so captured were of
British or foreign importation because they are purchased by natives before they
leave Maskat, and therefore complications arising from foreign ownership would
not be encountered unless French proteges at Sur and other places, took up the
trade, which at present is not the case.
I am not aware whether the Sultan would be ready to co-operate with us
on these terms. He is sharp enough to see that although such a procedure
would be at first very profitable it would never theless result in the slaughter of
the goose which lay the golden egg, but it is quite certain that without his