Page 455 - Gulf Precis(VIII)_Neat

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co-operation we can do nothing ; but with it the traffic will soon cease to be
lucrative.”
With reference to the above representation, the Political Resident in'thc Persian
Gulf was informed on the 7th October 1899, that while the Government of India
were not prepared to reconsider their previous decision not to pay the Sultan a
lump sum on account of compensation for losses, at the same time it was recog­
nised that success in preventing the smuggling of arms from Maskat to the
Persian Coast must largely depend upon the Sultan’s cordial co-operation in the
measures which might be adopted, and that it was advisable to enlist his
sympathy and assistance by giving him a direct interest in the results. Further,
that whatever the decision might be, regarding the seizure of arms of the
“ Baluchistan,” the Government of India would not be unwilling to recognise the
Sultan’s right to a predominant share in the disposition and value of all arms
which through his co-operation might be seized in Maskat waters while in course
of being smuggled in native vessels across to the Persian or Makran Coast.
Suggested concession to the Sultan of Maskat, 1899.

55. In a despatch No. 206, dated the 26th October 3899, the Government
of India recommended for the favourable consideration of Her Majesty’s Govern­
ment that, if it should be decided not to interfere on behalf of the traders whose
arms were seized by the Sultan’s order, the Sultan should be allowed to keep the
arms, or to receive the value of them.
Captain Cox’s report on the arms traffic at Maskat, 1899.
56. Under date the 14th November 1899 Captain Cox forwarded a report
regarding the traffic in arms and ammunition
Secret E., April 1900, Nos. 107—141.
at Maskat. From it, it appeared that for
the five months ending with the 31st October 1899, the total arms sold was 3,792
by the British subjects reporting their sales. The manner of distribution of these
munitions after arrival in Maskat was, roughly speaking, as follows:—
(a) 5 per cent, is not re-exported, but‘comes into use in Maskat and the
immediate interior.
(£) 40 per cent, goes to the Pirate Coast and Koweit.
(c) 30 per cent, is divided between Lingah, Mashur and Hindian.
(d) 20 per cent, goes to Bunder Abbas.
From these estimates it will be seen that over 90 per cent, of the arms left
Maskat again by sea.
They appeared to be exported principally indriblets ; hardly a dhow leaving
the port without a few. In many cases they were covered by passes under the
seal and signature of the Sultan, setting forth that they were consigned to
subjects at Sohar and that neighbourhood (between Maskat and- Cape Mussen-
dum). Others were no doubt smuggled without passes; generally, it was believed,
.n bales of dry limes or bundles of date mats.
Captain Cox further stated that he had been informed that previous to the
seizure of arms from the " Baluchistan ” parties of Afghans and other Pathans
used to pay periodical visits to Maskat and make extensive purchases; they
had now ceased to visit Maskat, but had turned their attentions to Bunder Abbas
instead. Those munitions which went to the Pirate Coast were for the most part
taken up by the tribes of the Hinterland, from whom the demand appeared to be
strong and constant; the chief dep6t for the distribution of them on that coast
was said to be Ajwan, a small port near Shargah.
From this report it became evident that if a British Consul were located at
Bunder Abbas, we should be in a better position to get the Persian Government
to prevent the smuggling of arms to that place.
It was also thought that many of the dhows found their way to Gwadur.