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October. The allied ships in Swally had belatedly- the galleons for cruising off Swally to intercept
put to sea on the 20th, too late to help their consorts; outward-bound Indiamen, but this idea was likewise
and three other Dutch vessels from Batavia under the abandoned in view of the strength of the allied
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i 1, command of Frederic Cistiens, which passed Botelho’s squadron, and the fact that the whole naval might of
V : squadron off Bombay on the 28th, likewise avoided an the Portuguese in India was concentrated in Botelho’s
1 engagement. Botelho remained overhauling his vessels armada ; and it was finally resolved that the galleons
at Bombay until January, 1626, when he was reinforced should cruise off the straits of Bab-el-Mandib, at the
by the galleons Sao Sebastido, Sdo Jeronimo and Reis entrance to the Red Sea, with the double object of
MagoSy carrying 550 men and 80 guns, commanded by picking up some profitable prizes, and of avoiding a
Antonio Telles who had been sent by the Viceroy from. battle with the greatly superior enemy fleet. They
Goa on the 22nd December, 1625. Meanwhile the were to remain off the Red Sea until May, when they
joint Anglo-Dutch fleet of ten ships sailed for Persia were to go to Muscat or to Tiwai for supplies, and
at the beginning of December,1 and on their return thence to the West coast of India in September, in
to Swally in February, 1626, they found in the road order to surprise and capture the isolated outward
another four sail of Dutch vessels under Herman Van bound Indiamen, which were due to arrive at Swally
Speult, which had just arrived from.Batavia.1 ■ in that season.1 '
There were now some fifteen English and Dutch In fulfilment of this plan of campaign, Botelho left
ships at Swally, and in view of this overwhelming force, Bombay for the Red Sea shortly after having been
the position of Botelho’s seven galleons at Bombay reinforced by an additional galleon, the Santo AndrJy
gave rise to great anxiety in the minds of the Viceroy from Goa, thus bringing the strength of his squadron
and his council at Goa. It had been originally up to eight sail.1 There had been some talk amongst
* intended to send the armada to Muscat to protect the allied commanders of attacking and destroying
that stronghold from an expected Anglo-Dutch attack, Botelho’s squadron as it lay in Bombay road, “ so
but this idea had been given up when it was heard their was pretence of exsecution of it, but as smoke it
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' that Ruy Freyre had withdrawn there from Ormuz vanisht, thoughe of English and Dutch we wear 14
: on the appearance of the combined squadron in the ships and pineses.”3 Botelho’s galleons cruised off
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Gulf at the end of 1625.8 The next plan was to use
suggestion. Ruy Freyre received two ships from Goa with munitions in
November.
*James, Jonas, Anne and Falcon under the command of Captain Weddell
for the Engliih, and Goede Fortuijn, Bantam, Engelsche Beer, Gouden Lecuio, lViceroy’s letter, op. ctt.
IValcheren and Heusden under Cistiens for the Dutch. Weddell’s order* *Sao Francisco Xavier (flagship), Sao Francisco, Sao Sebastiad, Sao Salvador,
for the voyage, and an account of it, will be found in the documents calendared Sao Jeronimo, Reis Magos, Sdo Pedro and Santo Andrl.
on pp. 105-117 of Foster’s English Factories, 1624-1629.
!! •Foster op. cit., p. 117. The allied fleet was composed of the James,
i *Mauritius, Oranje, Hollandia and a prize. It will be recalled that Van Jonas, Anne, Falcon, Spy (English), and the Gouden Leeuto, Oranje, HoUandia,
Speult was the man responsible for the “ massacre ” of Amboina, but he Mauritius. Goede Fortuyn, Beer, Walcheren, Bantam and Heusden (Dutch).
seems to have been on good terms with Weddell, although Kenidge and the The English laid the blame for the failure of the expedition to materialise on
1 • i Surat factors protested against his appointment. the faint-heartedness of “ Butcher Speult” (Foster, pp. 117-137); but the
Dutch attribute it to want of enthusiasm on the part of the English.
•Viceroy’s letter, Goa, 26/ii/i626. The Anglo-Dutch threat against (McLeod : De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azie, (Rijswijlc,
Muscat did not materialise, although the Persians frequently broached the
I 1928), p. 4*8).
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