Page 69 - Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabi & Uman (1800-1870)
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he had given up the towns. This humiliating treatment made a deep impression
on Muhammad who, once freed, made his way to al-Dir‘Iyah to convey his
complaint and request protection.478
The Amir Su‘ud, who had already been informed about the Masqatls’ latest
expedition, learned more about the political affairs of the sultanate from
Muhammad b. Nasir. He eventually decided to punish Sa‘Id for what he had
done, and so sent Mutlaq al-Mutayri, accompanied by Muhammad b. Nasir,
to ‘Uman with a strong force of men. Arriving in ‘Uman, Mutlaq organized the
administration and entrusted the regions under his authority to the most
powerful allied leaders—Hamad b. Nasir of ‘Aynayn, Muhammad b. Nasir
al-Jabri and ‘Azzan b. Qays of Suhar. Each of the leaders served as a territorial
chief responsible to al-Dir‘Iyah through Mutlaq.479 Such arrangements helped
Mutlaq to operate widely and effectively without much oppostion; as a result,
he was able to tighten his grip on a large part of the country in a relatively short
period.
Mutlaq first proceeded towards Wadi al-Ma'awil, where he expelled the
Masqat! garrisons from the forts of Sama’il and Bidbid and delivered them to
Muhammad. He then turned to the Batinah coast, took Shlnas from ‘Azzan,
the governor of Suhar, and in a matter of weeks managed to seize most of the
harbours in the area.
The effect of these events on Sa‘Id b. Sultan was enormous. His real
authority was now confined to the capital (Masqat) and its vicinity. As a result
of his conduct, he had lost the loyalty of a great number of supporters in the I
highlands of ‘Uman, endangered his commerce on the sea, and finally
provoked the hostility of the Su‘udl state. To halt the advancing troops and to
protect Masqat from inevitable total incorporation into the Su‘udl state, Sa‘Id
resorted to diplomacy. He called on Mudaq al-Mutayri and a setdement was
negoriated binding Sa‘Id to restore his aliiance with al-Dir‘Iyah authority and
assuring his cooperauve policy. He hoped by such an overture to bring things
back to normal and create an atmosphere favourable to further understanding.
As a number of harbours important to the security and commerce of Masqat
was now in Su‘udl hands, Sa‘Id endeavoured to get them back. Eventually he
sent a mission to al-Dir‘Iyah requesting the restoration of those harbours. It
appears, however, that the deputation failed to produce favourable results.
Amir Su‘ud, still suspicious of Sa’Id’s conduct, wanted him to prove his
cooperation and good faith. He told the mission that the restoration of the
harbours depended upon Sard’s willingness to join other allies, the ‘Utub and
the Qawasim, in the attack on al-Basrah.480 Su‘ud also threatened that if his
order was not carried out, he would visit Masqat in person after his return from
a pilgrimage in the spring.481 The Su‘udl influence was now at its zenith at
Masqat as well as on the Gulf.482 At the same time, the Su‘udls appointed
Husayn b. ‘All as paramount shaykh of the Qawasim.
Such developments should have dispirited the ruler of Masqat and
compelled him to abandon any action which might be interpreted as either
defiant of al-Dir‘Iyah orders or else as a challenge to its authority. But Sard’s
traditional hostilities with the Qawasim induced him to take advantage of
k a^sence u* Makkah in the spring by undertaking an expedition against
the newly-appointed QasimI shaykh at Ra‘s al-Khaymh. He was joined by a
Bushire and by the British frigate, the ‘Cornwallis*.483 Nonetheless,
Sa Id ended up returning home without results.
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